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ABORTION, MORAL LAW, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FETAL
RIGHTS & FREEDOM OF RELIGION
BARBARA PFEFFER BILLAUER*
ABSTRACT
The status of abortion as murder, and therefore amenable to
governmental intervention and criminalization, has been asserted
by those favoring limits on abortion. Opponents claim a superior
right of privacy and/or equality exists under the Constitution, vesting
in a woman the right to decide activities and actions that affect her
physical corpus. The claimed interest of a State to protect the fetus
is impliedly based on the concept of “morality” or “natural law,”
specifically on the premise that feticide is violative of the basic code
of conduct of societal norms. To my knowledge, until now, this is the
first investigation undertaken to determine whether in fact indica-
tors of “natural law” or the moral code support this claim from a
legal perspective.
To investigate whether there is any “moral” basis to support the
State’s claim and the Supreme Court’s recent rulings, I first exam-
ined the earliest and most important social codes that have governed
the conduct of “man” since the beginnings of civilization, finding that
none regard feticide within forty days of gestation as murder. I next
investigated international views on abortion to determine if consen-
sus on abortion regulations existed, (and which would be expected
if a collective “moral code” existed) and found none, either in timing
of allowable abortion on demand or exceptions to any restrictions.
I also demonstrate that the Catholic position on legitimacy of
killing a life form (based on the Sixth Commandment of the Deca-
logue) is vastly different than, say, the Jewish view, and that this
appears to be a driving force behind the courts’ positions. As such,
invidious, idiosyncratic religious influences are likely driving abor-
tion regulations. I therefore suggest the Freedom of Religion Clause
specifically bars legal intervention into practice, whether legislative
or by judicial fiat.
* While pursuing a PhD at the Faculty of Law of Haifa University, Barbara Pfeffer
Billauer is on the faculty of the Zefat Academic College of Law and is Research Professor
of Scientif ic Statecraft at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. She has
litigated in the areas of medical malpractice, toxic torts, and health law for two decades
before deciding to further her career and education in Israel, where she has also written
on the intersection of law, science, and religion.
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In sum, this Article demonstrates that abortion or feticide is not
considered either murder (or even killing another human) by many
traditions, religious or moral, and concludes that regulating abor-
tion as sin, rather than crime, should be left to religions’ determina-
tion rather than governmental intervention. As such, I suggest that
the most compelling argument then to support the claim of a woman’s
right to determine whether or not to abort would be on the basis of
the First Amendment’s guarantee of Freedom of Religion.
SUMMARY
The American position on abortion has advanced and retreated
over the last decade. One commentator suggested that the retrogres-
sion might be due to a Catholic Supreme Court majority scaling
back abortion rights based on their religious beliefs.1 To evaluate
whether religion is influencing abortion law (which suggests that
the driving force restricting abortions in the US is masquerading
under Constitutional issues, when in reality it is driven by personal
credo), I investigated international abortion practices and catego-
rized them by the major religious affiliation of its population. This
is only a preliminary study and more work should be done to evalu-
ate whether the level of religiosity (rather than the particular reli-
gion) also influences the outcome. To my knowledge, this is the first
study evaluating the role of a country’s religion in determining its
abortion policy as a surrogate for evaluating whether the American
position is truly based on “originalism,” as Justice Scalia argued,
morality,2 or personal religious views of the deciders.
I. PROLOGUE
A. The First Amendment to the Constitution (Ratified 1791)
B. Preamble to the Constitution of the United States
C. Thomas Jefferson on Religious Freedom
II. AN OVERVIEW: THE RIGHT TO THE MEDICAL PROCEDURE OF
ABORTION
III. PROTECTING THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE: CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS
A. The Right of Privacy
B. The Right of Equality and Equal Protection
1. Lyle Denniston, Do the Religious Beliefs of Supreme Court Justices Influence
Their Decisions?, MOMENT (Jan.–Feb. 2015) http://www.momentmag.com/symposium
-religion-supreme-court/ [http://perma.cc/D2RLL9NE].
2. Robert Cassidy, Scalia on Abortion: Originalism. . . But, Why?, 32 TOURO L. REV.
741, 741 (2016).
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C. Rights Reneged
D. The Potential Person, the Profound Interest and the
Illogic of It All
E. Rights in Conflict
F. Retrogression and Outmoded Trespass on Autonomy
G. Equal Protection and The Double Standard
1. The Death Penalty in Texas
2. The Dunn Case
H. Revisionist History: The Good Ol’ Days of Corsets and
Chastity Belts
IV. IS IT LEGITIMATE FOR THE STATE TO PROTECT FETAL RIGHTS?
A. Examination of Fetal Rights as a Determination of
Its Status
B. The Moral Imperative (Natural Law)
1. The Moral Imperative: An Overview
2. Morality and Abortion: A Historical Approach
a. The Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu
b. Hammurabi’s Code
c. The Mosaic Code (The Decalogue)
d. The Justinian Code
C. Current Views of “The Greater Good” as a Determinant of
Morality
D. Does Religion Influence a State’s Decision to Regulate
Abortion?
1. Abortion in Catholic Countries
a. The Six Absolutist Countries—And Ireland




c. The Liberal Catholic Jurisdictions
i. Italy, France and Mexico City
ii. Canada
2. Abortion in Israel
3. Abortion and Greek Orthodoxy
4. Abortion in Hindu Countries: India and Nepal
5. Abortion in Islamic Countries
6. Abortion in the Orient: Taoism, Buddhism,
Shintoism and Atheism
E. Reconciling the Results
V. THE POINT OF PERSONHOOD
A. Is Killing an Embryo Murder?
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B. Killing v. Murder: Back to the Source—A History of
Biblical Mistranslation
C. A History of Biblical Mistranslation
VI. FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: SCIENCE V. EMOTION
CONCLUSION
I. PROLOGUE
A. The First Amendment to the Constitution (Ratified 1791)
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.” 3
B. Preamble to the Constitution of the United States
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.4
C. Thomas Jefferson on Religious Freedom
“The rights [to religious freedom] . . . are of the natural rights
of mankind, and . . . if any act shall be . . . passed to repeal [an act
granting those rights] . . . or to narrow its operation, such as [sic]
would be an infringement of natural right.” 5
“[Religion is] a subject on which I have ever been most scrupu-
lously reserved. I have considered it as a matter between every man
and his maker in which no other, [and] far less the public, had a
right to intermeddle.” 6
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
5. Thomas Jefferson and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, VA. HIST. SOC’Y.,
http://www.vahistorical.org/collections-and-resources/virginia-history-explore/thomas
-jefferson [https://perma.cc/QS9WY8SL].
6. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush (May 31, 1813), http://founders
.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-06-02-0155 [https://perma.cc/3AHMY9EP] (citing
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 160–61 (J. Jefferson Looney ed., Princeton Univ.
Press 2009)).
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II. AN OVERVIEW: THE RIGHT TO THE
MEDICAL PROCEDURE OF ABORTION
Few other legal issues spark as emotional a debate as the right
of a pregnant woman to choose to abort the fetus or embryo7 she is
carrying.8 Few other legal issues enjoy such disparate outcomes in
different jurisdictions.9 Few other issues find their way repeatedly
before the Supreme Court for re-resolution10 (this issue being most
recently revisited in the case of Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,
decided in June).11 Few other issues are crystallized on as weak (or
subjective) a platform of evidence as the right of abortion. The issue
is an example of outcome-determinedness at its worst.
It would seem that those who believe abortion should be a
woman’s right know it in their gut, and those who believe the fetus
has a right to be born embrace it with their heart. Each tries to find
a constitutional basis to support their convictions; neither side will
ever convince the other, and neither side will be satisfied to let the
matter lie. Even after the last Supreme Court go-around,12 if recent
7. For the difference between an embryo and a fetus, see James A. O’Brien, What
Is The Difference Between An Embryo And A Fetus? THE BUMP, http://www.thebump
.com/a/difference-between-embryo-and-fetus [http://perma.cc/M9SR93ME] (“The embryo
is defined as the developing pregnancy from the time of fertilization until the end of the
eighth week of gestation, when it becomes known as a fetus. . . . During the embryonic
period, cells begin to take on different functions. The brain, heart, lungs, internal organs,
and arms and legs begin to form. Once a baby is a fetus, it’s more about growth and
development to prep for life on the outside.”) (emphasis added).
8. Arunima Sarkar, Articulating Various Facets of Female Reproductive Laws:
Issues and Challenges, 2 INDIAN J. OF LEGAL PHIL. 168, 174 (2014) (“Abortion is possibly
the most divisive women’s health issue that policy makers and planners face, particu-
larly in developing countries where safe abortion facilities are not available to most
women.”) (citation omitted).
9. See The World’s Abortion Laws 2014, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, https://www.re
productiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/f iles/documents/AbortionMap2014.PDF
(describing the international variance in abortion regulations).
10. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2230 (2016) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (“The constitutionality of laws regulating abortion is one of the most contro-
versial issues in American law . . . .” ).
11. Id.
12. The Whole Woman’s Health decision provoked Rorschach-like responses in schol-
ars and commentators. See Kevin C. Walsh, Symposium: The Constitutional Law of
Abortion after Whole Woman’s Health—What Comes Next?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28,
2016, 10:56 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-the-constitutional-law
-of-abortion-after-whole-womans-health-what-comes-next [http://perma.cc/VCJ68VFA]. The
perspective of bloggers are clearly reflected in their opinions—although some pro-choice
proponents view the decision as a huge victory, others are clearly disappointed it doesn’t
go far enough. And advocates on both sides are clever in their choice of rhetoric: Erika
Bachiochi says, “There is no question that the Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt is a win for abortion clinics and their doctors.
Whether the decision is a victory for women and for liberty, we ought not be so sure,”
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legal history is any guide, the abortion issue (and matters involving
reproductive freedom) will continually raise its phantom face, unless
we find a better way to resolve the matter.
Supreme Court watchers eagerly awaited the decision in Whole
Woman’s Health, in the hopes it might at least clarify some of the
constitutional controversy. Notwithstanding the litany of academics
and advocates sounding in,13 the case proved unenlightening on the
core constitutional issues. As Kevin Walsh stated: “Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt began with the potential to be a big case in a big
Term. It has ended as a doctrinally insignificant but ideologically
ominous case in a transitional Term.”14 To my mind, the Justices
chose to define—and hence decide—the case on narrow factual
grounds (whether compliance with specific health regulations con-
stituted an undue burden), and the greater part of the decision turned
on strict procedural issues such as the reach of res judicata. The
definitional issue of exactly what constitutes “undue burden” is never
discussed, inviting more cases with different facts to reach the
Court, and the ultimate basis for the abortion right is hardly men-
tioned, with only a passing reference to prior cases, as if genuflecting
in mindless obeisance. Past cases have proved far more illuminat-
ing, if provocative and controversial.
Previous cases raised the issues of privacy,15 equality,16 the right
to be safe from unreasonable search and seizure,17 funding avail-
ability,18 and, of course, the ever-present ghost of Justice Scalia’s
“originalism.”19 Enlightened views of freedom from the “servitude”
of bearing an unwanted child have been offered by lawyers and
before concluding her post with, “Yet if we are to believe the women who regret their
abortions, who outnumber men in their support for restrictions on abortion, and who
view abortion as a failure of a nation to come to terms with the distinctive needs of
women, we ought not be so sure.” Erica Bachiochi, Symposium: Is Hellerstedt This
Generation’s Roe?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2016, 11:46 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com
/2016/06/symposium-is-hellerstedt-this-generations-roe/ [https://perma.cc/H7BHJVAE].
13. SCOTUSblog Case File: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, SCOTUSBLOG,
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/whole-womans-health-v-cole [https://perma.cc
/VV8VTU8T].
14. Walsh, supra note 12.
15. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C.L. REV. 375, 380 (1985).
16. See Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Equality Arguments for Abortion Rights, 60
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 160, 162 (2013).
17. See Note, Physically Intrusive Abortion Restrictions as Fourth Amendment
Searches and Seizures: A New Conceptual Avenue for Challenging Abortion Restrictions,
128 HARV. L. REV. 951, 953–54 (2015) [hereinafter Physically Intrusive].
18. See An Overview of Abortion Laws, GUTTMACHER INST. (Oct. 1, 2016), https://www
.guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/V6KU3CQD].
19. See Ronald Turner, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia’s Originalist Defense of
Brown v. Board of Education, 62 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 170, 174 (2014).
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philosophers of less developed countries.20 Thus far, all these pre-
mises have proved unsatisfactory as they never seem to resolve the
matter with any finality.21 Some legal commentators have proposed
that synthetically including both the rights of liberty and equality
as the predicates for delegitimizing incursions into a woman’s right
to abortion “leaves abortion right [sic] on stronger legal and political
footing than a liberty analysis alone.” 22 This may well be true and
deserves to be examined, but it is also a tacit admission that either
rubric alone is too flimsy a foundation to withstand the repeated
attacks leveled at this most personal of choices.23
Thus, while the predicates of privacy and equality rights appear
persuasive, these arguments leave those seeking a response to the
“originalism” argument hungry. For those requiring a more “literal”
constitutional basis on which to prohibit governmental incursion
into regulating or banning abortion, this Article asserts that the
First Amendment right of Freedom of Religion provides such protec-
tion.24 I also suggest that an appeal to the objective of forming “a
more perfect Union” 25 also may provide a more satisfying—and
20. Sarkar, supra note 8, at 175 (“Human Rights activist [sic] see forced pregnancy
as a modified form of servitude, in which the body of women is owned by others for
sexual and reproductive purposes. . . . For an emancipated woman, forced pregnancy
resembles with [sic] the slavery system as she will have to bear the burden of foetus due
to forced pregnancy for many months. Forced pregnancy is not advantageous even from
the child’s perspectives. Studies reveal that, children born to mothers with forced preg-
nancy were likely to be picked up for drunkenness, drug abuse, antisocial or criminal
behaviour. . . .” ).
21. The rights of an entity “in utero” in inheritance cases—which American courts
have referred to as “enfant sa ventre sa mere,” is a precedentially potent legal arsenal
which might be better developed in the context of abortion. See, e.g., Donald A. Gianella,
The Difficult Quest for a Truly Humane Abortion Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 257, 257 (1968).
22. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 16, at 170.
23. See Walsh, supra note 12.
24. “[O]ne of the amendments to the constitution which expressly declares that ‘Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, . . .’ thereby guarding in the same sentence [and] under the same words
the freedom of religion, of speech [and] of the press. [sic] insomuch that whatever violates
either throws down the sanctuary which covers the others . . .” Thomas Jefferson,
Jefferson’s Draft, in 30 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, JAN. 1, 1798–JAN. 31, 1799,
536–43 (Princeton Univ. Press 2003).
25. U.S. CONST. pmbl. In a nutshell, a more “perfect Union” might be predicated on
considering the well-being of existing children in the family unit, on the grounds that
this would also benefit society as a whole. This consideration is a recognized condition
for allowing abortion in several countries, including the United Kingdom. See Britain’s
Abortion Law What it Says, and Why, BRITISH PREGNANCY ADVISORY SERV. 1, 4 (May
2013), http://www.reproductivereview.org/images/uploads/Britains_abortion_law.pdf. In
actuality, however, under the Constitution, “the more perfect union” clause referred to
the superiority of the federal government over the states. While this is a political con-
sideration, rather than a social one, in the case of abortion, it could be read to limit
states’ powers to curb abortion under a federal right of freedom to religion.
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lasting—rubric upon which to premise our decisions than ones cur-
rently employed.26 Although detailed exploration of the second premise
is outside the scope of this Article, it is pointed out that this concern
weighs the calculus heavily against fetal rights—as the fetus, on one
side, is only one potential human which affect the rights, freedoms
and happiness of existing human beings: its mother, father and
siblings. Following these threads to their logical outcomes leads to
the conclusion that the prospective mother is best suited to choose
whether she wishes to accept the assignment of birthing the fetus—
or if this will negatively impact her health or her family’s at any stage
of fetal development.27 Thus, we assume the prospective mother
would be sensitive to the requirements of her existing children and
family as a whole, whose collective rights would be superior to any
single potential life-form.28 This construct allows for a mother to
make decisions which inure to the societal well-being (a/k/a “a more
perfect union”).
To address the issue of “originalism,” it is important to consider
when and how curtailing a woman’s right to choose abortion arose
in the first place. From this perspective, instead of asking on what
basis can/should women be granted a right to choose an abortion,
should we not be asking: What is the (legally legitimate) basis for
the state to deny this right and on what basis can the state protect
alleged interests of a fetus to be born?29
Of course, one initial reaction is that the fetus is a human being,
deserving of all rights to which humans are entitled.30 As we shall
26. See U.N., ECON. & SOC. COUNCIL, POPULATION DIVISION, WORLD ABORTION POLI-
CIES (2013).
27. See Appendix B. See also Sarkar, supra note 8, at 176–77 (describing the case of
“Beatriz, a 22-year-old woman known to the world only by a single name, [who] has been
denied abortion in the El Salvador region as abortion is illegal and is punishable with thirty
years imprisonment. Beatriz has lupus, an auto-immune disease which causes the body’s
immune system to attack its own tissue. Her condition is deteriorating and her doctors say
she is at ‘high risk of death’ if the pregnancy continues. Medics have recommended an
abortion in order to save her life, but cannot proceed amid fear of prosecution.”) (internal
citation omitted). Situations where the mother’s health has deteriorated precipitously
during the pregnancy present compelling reasons why allowing abortion throughout the
pregnancy is societally wise.
28. The aphorism “when Mama’s happy—everybody’s happy” describes a relevant and
commonly held societal belief.
29. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 836 (1973) (noting “the principle
that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.” ). See also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973) (“In assessing the State’s interest, recognition may be given
to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved, the State may assert
its interests beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.”) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Religious Groups’ Official Positions on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
RELIGION AND PUB. LIFE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/religious
-groups-off icial-positions-on-abortion [http://perma.cc/7RJBPWLZ].
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see, this is entirely a religious view, one possessed in the main by
developing countries as opposed to industrialized ones, one which
does not enjoy any consensus on the international world scene today31
and one, as we shall see, which has little or no basis in fact, law,
history, or philosophy.
III. PROTECTING THE FREEDOM TO CHOOSE:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS
A. The Right of Privacy
In the field of bioethics, at least from an American perspective,
personal autonomy (or freedom) is regarded as one of the four legs
upon which the seat of societal conduct is supported.32 It is one
rubric for permitting the woman to choose how she will use her body.
This notion of the right of privacy, while not specifically enumerated
in American bioethical thought and which does not enjoy formal
constitutional veneration, is also a central tenet of the UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.33
It is well-accepted that a “right to privacy” has been carved out
by American courts when sexual matters are concerned. Thus, for
example, regarding gay rights, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas wrote
that the petitioners “are entitled to respect for their private lives”
and that the “State cannot demean their existence or control their
destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime.” 34 In the
abortion landmark cases, a right of privacy has been culled from the
concept of liberty or personal freedom or autonomy as a predicate for
a constitutional right to abortion.35 Hence, in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, decided roughly twenty years
after Roe, the court explained that a pregnant woman’s “suffering
is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more,
31. Id. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 160 (“There has always been strong support for the
view that life does not begin until live birth. This was the belief of the Stoics. It appears
to be the predominant, though not the unanimous, attitude of the Jewish faith. It may
be taken to represent also the position of a large segment of the Protestant community,
insofar as that can be ascertained; organized groups that have taken a formal position
on the abortion issue have generally regarded abortion as a matter for the conscience of
the individual and her family.” ) (citation omitted).
32. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS 58 (5th ed. 2001).
33. See UNESCO, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) Art.
3 (protecting the right of human dignity and respect for fundamental freedoms, which
would include the freedom to choose); Art. 9 (referring to confidentiality and dissemi-
nation of personal information).
34. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
35. See Joyce Arthur, Religion and Abortion, PRO CHOICE ACTION NETWORK (Oct.
2001), http://www.prochoiceactionnetwork-canada.org/prochoicepress/01autumn.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7U9G4NRD].
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upon its own vision of the women’s role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture.” 36
B. The Right of Equality and Equal Protection
While recognizing the privacy argument, Roe v. Wade,
locates the abortion right in the Due Process Clauses, [although]
the Supreme Court has since come to conceive of it as an equality
right as well as a liberty right [and] . . . case law now recognizes
equality arguments for the abortion right based on the Due Pro-
cess Clauses. Additionally, a growing number of justices have
asserted equality arguments for the abortion right independ-
ently based on the Equal Protection Clause.37
Justice Kennedy linked those rights to equal protection and created
a “due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty . . .” 38 This right is derivable,
according to the Supreme Court, from the fact that, “[t]he ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the
Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproduc-
tive lives.” 39 Later courts expanded the right of equality to include
the sensitivities demanded by their court-crafted right of privacy
and autonomy. Equality arguments focus on a “woman’s autonomy
to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature.” 40 It appears, however, that the trajectory of recent opin-
ions heralds a major pullback of these rights.
C. Rights Reneged
Expressly rejecting the State’s claim that life begins at concep-
tion,41 the Court in Roe held that prior to the point of viability (which
the court accepted to be twenty-eight weeks),42 the State has no
interest in protecting a fetus’ life, and after that point any interest
was subject to the primacy of protecting the mother’s right to life
and health:
36. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852
(1992).
37. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 16, at 164. It is presumed that the due process clause
of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are triggered.
38. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575 (2003).
39. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (1992).
40. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
42. Id. at 160 (according to the Roe court, “Viability is usually placed at about seven
months (28 weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks.”).
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For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its
interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is neces-
sary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.43
The Court notes that this holding has ample biological and his-
torical reasons for allowing the incursion after viability, but fails to
delineate those on which they base their opinion.44 This vagueness
provides the breeding ground for subsequent courts “to take liber-
ties” with the rights conferred by Roe.
The first major assault came in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,45 where the Court upheld a statute that included a preamble
which “defined life as beginning at conception,” 46 thereby disman-
tling essential philosophical (moral) principles established in Roe.
The case concerned physicians being directed to perform fetal viabil-
ity tests on women who were twenty or more weeks pregnant,
thereby scaling back the unfettered privacy allowed to the mother in
Roe by two months.47 Rehnquist defended his position which upheld
the local statute that contained this clause, pretty much by saying:
well, it’s only in the preamble, so it doesn’t count for much.48 In a blis-
tering dissent, Justice Blackmun took Justices Rehnquist, White, and
Kennedy to task for attempting to overturn Roe by what he claimed
were stealth tactics; “filled with winks, and nods, and knowing
glances to those who would do away with Roe explicitly . . . .”49
While Blackmun’s opinion rests at least partially on the doc-
trine of stare decisis, it is difficult to find a legal reason for the
43. Id. at 164–65.
44. Id. at 159–60. In fact, the court recognizes that valid formulations of interest in
determining when abortion is appropriate includes the point of live birth: “As we have
noted, the common law found greater significance in quickening. Physicians and their
scientif ic colleagues have regarded that event with less interest and have tended to focus
either upon conception, upon live birth, or upon the interim point at which the fetus
becomes ‘viable,’ that is, potentially able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with
artificial aid.” Id.
45. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
46. A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, PEW RESEARCH
CTR. (Jan. 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-abortion-rulings
-of-the-us-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/TZV3U7MG].
47. See id. at 3.
48. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 503, 506 (“The Court of Appeals determined that Missouri’s
declaration that life begins at conception was ‘simply an impermissible state adoption
of a theory of when life begins to justify its abortion regulations’. . . . Certainly the
preamble does not by its terms regulate abortion or any other aspect of appellees’
medical practice.” ).
49. Id. at 538 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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majority opinion. Thus, while Roe v. Wade at least examined several
options for deciding the time for initiating fetal rights (conception,
forty days, quickening, viability, and birth),50 Webster evaluates none,
and arbitrarily sets the trigger date as the earliest possible date of
viability—plus an additional (scientifically unvalidated) window of
four weeks to allow for laboratory error.51 It must be noted that even
today, seventeen years after Webster, the earliest viability date on
record is twenty-two weeks.52 Interestingly, from a reverse perspec-
tive, when a baby is born prematurely, physicians are loath to insti-
tute life-saving technologies before twenty-four weeks.53
The second assault on Roe came in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.54 While upholding Roe, the
court in Casey ruled that states could now regulate abortion during
the entire period before fetal viability, and they could do so for
reasons other than to protect the health of the mother. The result
was that a state’s interest in, and regulation of, potential life could
now arguably extend throughout a woman’s pregnancy.55 Perhaps
the most alarming aspect of Casey was its countenancing tinkering
with Roe.
In 2003, a conservative Congress enacted the Federal Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act which banned a certain abortion technique56
called the D and X procedure.57 Four years later, in 2007, the Court
in Gonzales v. Carhart, upheld the law, finding it constitutional.58
The Gonzales court held that Casey overruled prior cases “because
they undervalued the State’s interest in potential life.” 59 Like peel-
ing the layers of skin off an onion, Casey removes one layer of pro-
tection for the woman, and Gonzales peels off another.
We start off with the following pronouncement:
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130–40 (1973).
51. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 515–16 (1989).
52. Amanda Cable, The Tiniest Survivor: How the ‘Miracle’ Baby Born Two Weeks




53. JoNel Aleccia, Evidence Complicates Decisions on When to Save Preemies, THE
JERUSALEM POST (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.heraldextra.com/momclick/health-and-fit
ness/evidence-complicates-decisions-on-when-to-save-preemies/article_21958c01-f460-5b
97-b842-3cfa3430b9f0.html [https://perma.cc/4DK5MCUE].
54. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
55. Id. at 846.
56. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1531.
57. Dilation and Extraction/Evacuation. See infra note 88.
58. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, at 167–68 (2007).
59. Id. at 146 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 881–83).
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We assume the following principles for the purposes of this opin-
ion. Before viability, a State “may not prohibit any woman from
making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy.” 505
U.S., at 879 (plurality opinion). It also may not impose upon this
right an undue burden, which exists if a regulation’s “purpose or
effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 60
But while not explicitly overruling Roe v. Wade,61 the Gonzales
Court imposes an additional constraint, noting that:
“[r]egulations which do no more than create a structural mecha-
nism by which the State . . . [or the parent or guardian of a
minor] . . . may express profound respect for the life of the un-
born are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s exercise of the right to choose” id., at 877. Casey struck
a balance . . .62
It must be noted that Roe contemplated no such “out” clause
and rejected the State’s claimed balancing requirement.63 Further,
the loosey-goosey wording of the Gonzales Court, allowing regula-
tions which do no more than create a mechanism for the State to
impose its wishes, is the trap that creates that very mechanism,
such as the substantial obstacle test, and then furnishes the court
with the power to determine if the mechanism applies—and at what
point in the gestational timeline. Finally and most critically, it is not
clear from where the State derives its right to enforce its “profound
interest” in “the potential life,” other than some unsupported fiat
which asserts that the fetus becomes a human being at the unde-
fined point of viability.
60. Id.
61. While Roe established that before viability, the State’s interests are not strong
enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle
to the woman’s effective right to elect the procedure, it also is a confirmation of the
State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, “if the law contains exceptions for
pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health.” Gonzalez, 550 U.S. 124, 125
(2007) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 846).
62. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 126 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877) (emphasis added).
63. A “balance” implies a search for “equilibrium.” See Balance, MERRIAM WEBSTER
DICTIONARY (defining balance as “a state in which different things occur in equal or
proper amounts or have an equal or proper amount of importance”). Casey assumes that
each side (woman and fetus) come before the court imbued with equal rights, or rights
which at least on some level can be equalized. The court in Roe made no such inference.
And given the variety of “beliefs” on the issue, no legitimate “balance,” I submit, will
ever be acceptable.
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D. The Potential Person, the Profound Interest and the Illogic of
It All
In defending its incursions into the mother’s rights, the Casey
Court employs troubling language. Firstly, it diminishes the ful-
someness of rights enunciated in Roe, creating something of a
second-order tier of autonomy and privacy for women considering
abortion. As the court noted: “[b]ecause abortion involves the pur-
poseful termination of potential life, the abortion decision must be
recognized as sui generis, different in kind from the rights protected
in the earlier cases under the rubric of personal or family privacy
and autonomy.” 64 The distinguishing factor of abortion is that it
involves the “purposeful termination of a potential life.” 65
The legal definition of a “potential life” is never made clear, and
indeed this undefined chimera is the shadow that still lurks about,
searching for a safe (and permanent) legal haven through repeated
assaults on Roe, where it was first conceived. It must be recognized
that neither legal history nor natural law provides much support for
any guaranteed right to a “potential life-form” such that it trumps
the rights afforded to a live human.66 The best that can be said is
that there may be competing rights. However, this is not what the
court seems to be saying. What seems to emerge is that the poten-
tial life, the fetus, has a full right to be born, while the mother has
some diminished right of autonomy and privacy. (Her rights to equal-
ity, freedom, and liberty are not well-countenanced by the court).
The Roe Court notes three times that under certain circumstances—
occurring after the fetus attains viability: “recognition may be given
to the less rigid claim that as long as at least potential life is involved,
the State may assert interests beyond the protection of the pregnant
woman alone.” 67 Indicating that “some phrase it [the State’s interest
64. Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.
65. Id. at 952.
66. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 (“[T]hroughout the major portion of the 19th century
prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, [which] persuades
us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the
unborn.”).
67. Id. at 154, 158–59 (“We, therefore, conclude that the right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualif ied and must be con-
sidered against important state interests in regulation. . . . All this, together with our
observation, supra, that, throughout the major portion of the 19th century, prevailing
legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word
‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn. This is in
accord with the results reached in those few cases where the issue has been squarely
presented. . . . Indeed, our decision in United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) . . .
inferentially is to the same effect, for we there would not have indulged in statutory
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in the ‘potential person’] in terms of [a] duty,” 68 the Court gives no
reason or basis for this assertion.69
The concept of a “potential person” having rights, however, is
logically untenable. Do we allow a potential mother to take deduc-
tions on her income tax for the hoped-to-be-born dependent? Do we
allow a potential charitable donor to take a deduction for the amount
he plans to donate?
It appears that the only basis on which abortion restrictions can
survive a legal challenge is some ephemeral assertion that the fetus
is an entity with a close-enough relation to humanhood such that we
consider it human—but only at a certain point in time—that point
in time being under dispute. From this concept of “potential life,”
modern courts created the right to be born.
Claiming that the fetus (or embryo) is entitled to a legal right
to future birth (a right to life), or that the State has a profound in-
terest in the embryo or fetus is logically flawed, as seen by the way
the fetal entity is otherwise treated. For example, does the fetus
have the right to choose how it wants to be born? Whether it wants
to be born via C-section (harmful to the public health by squander-
ing resources, yet preferred by some women and many doctors) or nat-
ural birth, squished through a narrow birth canal, risking shoulder
dystocia and other forms of damage? Do we ask the fetus whether
it wants to be welcomed into the world in the warm cocoon of a
Leboyer atmosphere versus the noisy hustle and bustle of the stan-
dard delivery room?70
Of course, the facile response is: the fetus cannot answer. But
why is there no provision for appointment of a legal surrogate or a
guardian ad litem, as is customary where children’s rights can’t be
interpretation favorable to abortion in specif ied circumstances if the necessary conse-
quence was the termination of life entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection.”).
68. Id. at 150.
69. Id. at 159 (“As we have intimated above, it is reasonable and appropriate for a
State to decide that at some point in time another interest, that of health of the mother
or that of potential human life, becomes significantly involved. The woman’s privacy is
no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured accordingly.”)
(emphasis added). Subsequent courts elevate this right of the State to a “profound”
respect, one that pervades the entire pregnancy—even before viability. See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
70. In Israel, the fetus, once born, is not allowed to sue for injuries predating birth
that he or she claims would warrant abortion (wrongful life) although the parents can
maintain an action for wrongful birth and costs of raising the child. Tomer Zarchin &
Dan Even, Children With Birth Defects Can No Longer Sue for Malpractice, HAARETZ
(May 29, 2012, 1:41 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/children-with-birth-de
fects-can-no-longer-sue-for-malpractice-1.433038 [http://perma.cc/BZD3225X]; see also
CA 1326/07 Hammer v. Amit (2012) (Isr.) (expanding “wrongful birth” as a cause of action
for parents but no longer recognizing it is a “child’s claim”).
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otherwise protected, or where their rights are adverse to their par-
ents’ beliefs? These issues often arise where, for example, Jehovah’s
witness’ refuse blood transfusions for their children.71 There, we
empower the State to take control over the welfare of the child
under the doctrine of parens patriae.72 In cases of abortion, however,
the courts act as a sort of societal guardian ad litem, deciding only
the limited fetal right to be born, but not how or when. But why is
that? Is it because, perhaps, deep down inside we don’t really be-
lieve the fetus is yet “human”? Is it because we really aren’t sure
what it is, so we make a moral compromise: let’s just not kill it.
To restate the question then: Jurisprudentially, there are four
logical outcomes:
a. The fetus is a non-person and hence abortion is allowed on
demand, as the human carrier has the right of autonomy
and privacy to determine how she wants to use her body.
71. See M.N. v. S. Baptist Hosp. of Fla., 648 So. 2d 769, 770 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(holding that “as between parent and child, the ultimate welfare of the child is the con-
trolling factor” where parents refused consent for a blood transfusion and chemotherapy
for their eight month old infant). But see Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 265–66 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that the prioritization of the child’s welfare does not apply
to the case of a fetus which is not yet viable).
72. See Burton, 49 So. 3d at 265–66. In Burton, a woman was compelled against her
will to compulsory bed rest to protect the viability of the fetus. 49 So. 3d at 264. The
court noted that the fetus is not entitled to protection under the guise of parens patriae,
noting that “[t]he state’s interest in the potentiality of life of an unborn fetus becomes
compelling ‘at the point in time when the fetus becomes viable,’ defined as ‘the time at
which the fetus becomes capable of meaningful life outside the womb, albeit with arti-
ficial aid.’ ” Id. at 266. The Court of Appeals ruled that the appellant suffered a significant
deprivation of her physical liberty and personal freedom and ruled that the trial court
had erroneously focused its ruling on the best interests of the child, where it determined
that forced treatment of the mother was indicated for that purpose, instead of determin-
ing whether the State had a compelling interest in overriding the mother’s right to
refuse medical treatment. Id. at 265–66. While the balancing tests employed by the trial
judge may be appropriate in other circumstances (such as the competing rights of a
parent and an already born child), the Court of Appeals ruled this application of the
State’s parens patriae authority to override the appellant’s right to refuse medical
treatment for the unborn child was in error. Id. Upholding the woman’s right to privacy,
the court ruled that there was no competing right-to-life for the fetus as there was no
showing that the fetus had reached a sufficient stage of viability required to withstand
the State’s threshold. Id. Notably, the court rejected consideration under the right of
privacy: “No privacy rights of a pregnant woman were involved. The test to overcome a
woman’s right to refuse medical intervention in her pregnancy is whether the state’s
compelling state interest is sufficient to override the pregnant woman’s constitutional
right to the control of her person, including her right to refuse medical treatment. In
addition, where the state does establish a compelling state interest and the court has
found the state’s interest sufficient to override a pregnant patient’s right to determine
her course of medical treatment, the state must then show that the method for pursuing
that compelling state interest is ‘narrowly tailored in the least intrusive manner possible
to safeguard the rights of the individual.’ ” Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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b. The fetus is an (innocent) human person and hence abor-
tion is never allowed as the fetus is entitled to the right to
life which is superior to the mother’s.
c. Whether the fetus is a “person” varies with gestational age
(which in turn varies with the state of technology), and in
deference to society’s values (in some cases governed by
religion), we allow the fetus a single right—to be born un-
der some circumstances, a right which is superior to enu-
merated rights of the decidedly human carrier, or
d. Whether the fetus is a person is indeterminable, and we
make the same allowances as in option c.
In the United States (and most industrialized countries), we have
rejected choices (a) and (b), and hence by default have chosen option
(c) or (d). So, in a sense, we give the fetal entity partial rights. Not yet
human, just not animal. We confer on the fetus a presumptive right
to be born, which may not be rebuttable, at some undefined and
ever-changing point during the pregnancy, nominally referred to as
the point of viability.73
E. Rights in Conflict
[T]he principle [is] that the State has legitimate interests from
the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman
and the life of the fetus that may become a child. These princi-
ples do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.74
Assuming, arguendo, the fetus is a “human being,” or a “poten-
tial life with a right to be born” the conflict between universal rights
to dignity and liberty, (manifested in the right of autonomy, i.e., the
mother’s right to choose to abort) and the right of an innocent per-
son to life (i.e., a fetal right to be born), results in a head-on collision
which is not amenable to balancing. Historically, the impasse has
been resolved in an off-quoted maxim: one man’s liberty ends where
another man’s nose begins.75 This has been loosely translated as en-
visioning a society which provides for broad-scale personal freedom
73. The point of viability is, essentially, an inchoate time dependent on the state of
medical technology, the resources of the locality, and the insurance of the mother.
74. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 145 (2007) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
75. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARVARD L. REV.
957, 957 (1919) (“Each side takes the position of the man who was arrested for swinging
his arms and hitting another in the nose, and asked the judge if he did not have a right
to swing his arms in a free country. ‘Your right to swing your arms ends just where the
other man’s nose begins.’ ” ).
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amiably coexisting with one that follows legally derived and judi-
cially directed societal standards of justice.76 In the case of abortion,
this clash of values is smoothed over by the courts proclaiming that
their “legitimate” and “profound” interest in protecting the life of the
fetus, as well as the health of the pregnant woman, is not a contra-
diction.77 This is a fantasy. Assuming lemming-like behavior and
hiding its collective head, the Court is hoping no one will notice that
when we make compromises on behalf of fetuses, we sabotage rights
of its carrier (the pregnant woman), such as her rights to liberty,
autonomy, and to pursue happiness. And her rights, both legal and
ethical, bump up against whatever rights we may want to afford the
fetus—if, that is, we afford the fetus any rights at all.78 In determin-
ing whose rights are paramount—especially in the default situation—
the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate a clear standard upon which
it makes its decision.
Some scholars assert the primacy of the woman’s rights exists
under various constitutional guises. Professors Siegel and Siegel
contend that the equal protection of sex discrimination cases is re-
flective of a right of autonomy, which is conferred on pregnant women.
They also assert that the notion of equality helps delineate “the
kinds of restrictions on abortion that are unconstitutional under
Casey’s undue burden test,” 79 the very issues the Court in the Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt tried to resolve.80 These scholars claim
that “abortion restrictions that deny women’s equality impose an
undue burden on women’s fundamental right to decide whether to be-
come a mother . . . [and thus] [a]n equality-informed understanding
of Casey’s undue burden test prohibits government from coercing,
manipulating, misleading, or stereotyping pregnant women.” 81
Constitutional absolutists, of course, decry such tomfoolery with
the bible of American society, the Constitution, noting that privacy
76. See CASEBOOK ON BIOETHICS FOR JUDGES (Amnon Carmi & Barbara Pfeffer
Billauer, eds., UNESCO Chair of Bioethics Section on Judicial Education) (forthcoming
October 2016).
77. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 145 (“[T]he principle that the State has legitimate interests
from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus that may become a child. These principles do not contradict one another; and we
adhere to each.”) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 846). This statement contradicts the holding of
Roe v. Wade, where the compelling interest of the State in protecting the life of the fetus
that may become a child is considered the point of viability. 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
78. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 (“In areas other than criminal abortion, the law has been re-
luctant to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before life [sic] birth or
to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly defined situations and except when
the rights are contingent upon life [sic] birth.”).
79. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 16, at 165.
80. Whether they did this in an effective manner depends on who is asked.
81. Siegel & Siegel, supra note 16, at 165.
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and autonomy are not delineated or protected rights—although some
admit that societal interpretations should play a role in the Constitu-
tion’s interpretation.82 As Siegel and Siegel note: 
Some critics pejoratively refer to certain of the Court’s Due Pro-
cess decisions as recognizing “unenumerated” constitutional
rights. . . . [T]hese interpreters regard decisions like Roe, Casey,
and Lawrence, which recognize substantive rather than proce-
dural due process rights, as lacking a basis in the text of the
Constitution, hence as recognizing “unenumerated rights.” 83
F. Retrogression and Outmoded Trespass on Autonomy
The Siegels’ position is clearly demonstrated by an alternative
rendition of the Casey holding; that Casey replaced the viability
framework with the determination that regulation of abortion at
any stage of a woman’s pregnancy would be constitutional as long as
it did not constitute an “undue burden.” It is this conception that laid
the groundwork for Gonzales v. Carhart,84 which many criticized as
abortion law-retrogression.85 Along with women’s and civil rights
groups who attacked the ruling, the medical establishment sounded
in a starkly negative fashion, the editor of The New England Jour-
nal of Medicine writing, “until this opinion, the Court recognized the
importance of not interfering with medical judgments made by physi-
cians to protect a patient’s interest. For the first time, the Court
permits congressional judgment to replace medical judgment.” 86
82. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 965 (1991) (exemplifying the Con-
stitutional absolutist argument in the context of penalties for possession of cocaine).
83. Siegel & Seigel, supra note 16, at 168–69.
84. George J. Annas, The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 356 N. ENGL. J. MED.
2201, 2206 (2007). Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 125 (2007).
85. Gonzales overturned several District Court decisions that restricted abortions.
See, e.g., Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1048 (2004), aff’d 413 F.3d 791 (8th
Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (granting a permanent injunction that prohibited
the Attorney General from enforcing the Act in all cases but those in which there was
no dispute that the fetus was viable); Planned Parenthood Fed’n Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F.
Supp. 2d. 957, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 550
U.S. 124 (2007) (concluding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act was unconsti-
tutional “because it (1) pose[d] an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose a second
trimester abortion; (2) [was] unconstitutionally vague; and (3) require[d] a health exception
as set forth by . . . Stenberg.” ).
86. “The American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists called the decision
‘shameful and incomprehensible’ in a statement.” Attention Media: There’s No “Unsettled
Science” In The Contraception Challenges, PUB. HEALTH WATCH (Mar. 13, 2014), https://
publichealthwatch.wordpress.com/2014/03/13/attention-media-theres-no-unsettled-science
-in-the-contraception-challenges [http://perma.cc/N9S4ARH7] (“ ‘This decision discounts
and disregards the medical consensus that intact D&E is safest and offers significant
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Justice Ginsburg was particularly eloquent and vehement on
this point.87 Similarly, Professor Stone explained:
The five justices in the majority in Gonzales have put at risk the
health of women who suffer from heart disease, uterine scarring,
bleeding disorders, compromised immune systems, and certain
pregnancy-related conditions, such as placenta previa and accreta,
as well as those women carrying fetuses with certain abnormali-
ties, such as severe hydocephalus. In all of these circumstances,
and many others, the use of the intact D & E is necessary to
ensure the health of the woman. It is important to note that the
prohibition of intact D & E has nothing to do with preserving the
life of a fetus. The “partial birth abortion” law does not prohibit
any abortions. Rather, it prohibits only a particular means of
performing abortions. If the woman is willing to undergo a
greater than necessary risk to her health, she may terminate her
pregnancy by other, less safe, methods. She may, for example,
have the fetus terminated by injection prior to extraction, or
removed by cesarean, or extracted by non-intact D & E (which
involves dismembering the fetus in utero).” 88
The incursion into abortion rights on (medical) procedural
grounds in Gonzales and the medical issues raised in Whole Woman’s
Health are difficult to track with constitutional imperatives, and
perhaps impossible, I argue, to reconcile: What, constitutionally, is
considered an “undue burden”? And who makes that decision? The
very court that allows its imposition?
G. Equal Protection and The Double Standard
Even assuming, arguendo, a right to protect a viable fetus does
exist, this right must be balanced against the rights and needs of
others. When a viable fetus is given superior rights to that of its
female nurturer (or other living offspring of the pregnant woman)
we must entertain the notion that some subtle form of chauvinism
is at work. One way of examining this is to investigate other in-
stances where killing is permitted. Since the case of Whole Woman’s
benef its for women suffering from certain conditions that make the potential compli-
cations of non-intact D&E especially dangerous.’ . . . ‘Moreover, it diminishes the doctor-
patient relationship by preventing physicians from using their clinical experience and
judgment.’ ” ).
87. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 169–91.
88. Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Faith-Based Justices, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 20,
2007), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/our-faithbased-justices_b_46398
.html [http://perma.cc/7QZV6TXC].
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Health v. Hellerstedt89 and the law on which it is based90 derive from
the State of Texas, this state makes a good test venue. Should we
determine that women, as a group, are singled out and forced or
coerced to bear, support, and carry an unwanted life-form, the tradi-
tional notions of violation of Equal Protection would apply and restric-
tions on abortion would be unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1. The Death Penalty in Texas
Texas is one of thirty-one states in which the death penalty is
legal.91 Not only is capital punishment legal on the books, its practice
is well-countenanced in Texas. Since the death penalty was reinsti-
tuted with Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),92 Texas has exe-
cuted more inmates than any other state; in the last thirty years, over
500 people have been executed in Texas alone.93 It would therefore
appear that the State of Texas, its voters, legislators, judges, and ex-
ecutives countenance the need for killing—at least under certain
circumstances such as punishment for murdering others.
2. The Dunn Case
The legitimacy of taking a human life in Texas has also been
recognized where that life poses a drain on societal resources—even
when the human in question is desirous of continuing his or her
existence!94 In the recent case of Kelly v. Houston Methodist Hospi-
tal,95 a forty-five-year-old hospital patient, lucid and conscious, was
condemned to death by lethal injection (after removal of his feeding
and breathing tubes) by his physicians, a decision seconded by the
Hospital’s Ethics committee on the grounds that future care was
89. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. 15-274, 84 U.S.L.W. 4534 (U.S. 2016).
90. Texas H.B. 2 (2013).
91. Facts About the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2016), http://
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty [https://perma.cc/W7AK
NA67].
92. The death penalty was reinstituted in the instant cases; as Furman had not
outlawed the application of the death penalty outright, executions continued during the
interim period.
93. Executions in the U.S. 1608–2002: The ESPY File Executions by State, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 31, 2015), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org [https://perma.cc
/8GNQFZ26]. See Death Row Information, TEX. DEP’T OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, https://www
.tdcj.state.tx.us/death_row/dr_executed_offenders.html [https://perma.cc/BAU9LHQT].
94. Whether it is called killing, murder, or euthanasia.
95. Plaintiffs’ First Amended Petition at 1–2, Kelly v. Houston Methodist Hosp., No.
2015-69681 (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Dunn
_v_Methodist_amended_petition.PDF.
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futile.96 All this is apparently legal in Texas under Texas’ Advance
Directives Act (which allows doctors to decide when to terminate
treatment—irrespective of a patient’s advanced directives).97 When
Mr. Dunn and his mother sought judicial stay of the execution, a
representative of the hospital filed papers seeking guardianship
(which included the patient’s records in an unsealed document,
possibly also violating the patient’s right to privacy and HIPAA).98
According to papers filed by Mr. Dunn in the District Court of
Harris County on November, 20, 2015 seeking to stay the decision:
The plaintiff,
David Christopher Dunn (“Dunn”), a Texas resident, is currently
receiving life sustaining treatment at The Methodist Hospital . . .
Dunn faces immediate irreparable harm of death if the life sustain-
ing treatment is discontinued. The Methodist Hospital seeks to
discontinue his treatment, and via a committee meeting for
which Dunn had neither legal counsel nor the ability to provide
rebuttal evidence, The Methodist Hospital found that it will dis-
continue life sustaining treatment [on] Tuesday, November 24,
2015 [two days before Thanksgiving]. Dunn believes the Texas
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution guarantees him a repre-
sentative to advocate for his life and opportunity to be heard
when life sustaining treatment is being removed. Dunn seeks a
temporary restraining order preserving the status quo of his
treatment. Dunn further seeks a declaration that Texas Health
and Safety Code Section 166.046 violates his due process rights
under the Texas Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. . . .
[which] allows doctors and hospital the absolute authority and
unfettered discretion to terminate life-sustaining treatment of
any patient, despite the existence of an advanced directive . . . or
expressed patient decision to the contrary.99
96. Id. at 2, 11.
97. This is not apparently an isolated case. See Chris Dunn’s Was Not a Singular
Case of Injustice in Texas, TEX. RIGHT TO LIFE (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.texasrighttolife
.com/chris-dunn-s-was-not-a-singular-case-of-injustice-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/N754
BBV2].
98. See Wesley J. Smith, Hospital Files Guardianship Petition for David Dunn,
NAT’L. REVIEW (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.nrostatic.com/human-exceptionalism/428363
/hospital-f iles-guardianship-petition-david-dunn-wesley-j-smith [https://perma.cc/7Q2B
P56U].
99. Plaintiff’s Original Verif ied Petition and Application for Temp. Restraining Order
and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, Dunn. v. Methodist Hosp. (Tex. Dist. Ct. filed Nov. 20, 2015),
http://www.thaddeuspope.com/images/Dunn_v_Methodist_001.pdf. Further, the district
court found that the patient’s due process rights were violated and granted him a two week
reprieve to f ind another hospital to administer to his needs. The extensions were granted
twice. See Steven Ertelt, Hospital Trying to Seize Guardianship of Disabled Patient from
His Family in Order to Kill Him, LIFENEWS.COM (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.lifenews
.com/2015/12/10/HOSPITAL-TRYING-TO-SEIZE-GUARDIANSHIP-OF-DISABLED

























































































H. Revisionist History: The Good Ol’ Days of Corsets and
Chastity Belts
The second rubric the Casey court uses to support its ruling is
a manipulated and misleading rendition of American history. Rather
than the detailed historical review undertaken by the Roe court, the
Casey court merely states, in hearsay fashion, that “the historical
traditions of the American people—as evidenced by the English com-
mon law and by the American abortion statutes in existence both at
the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s adoption and Roe’s issu-
ance—do not support the view that the right to terminate one’s
pregnancy is ‘fundamental.’ Thus, enactments abridging that right
need not be subjected to strict scrutiny.”100
It is interesting that the court selected the date of the Four-
teenth Amendment to tether its ruling. Indeed, the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted in 1868 when abortion was generally ille-
gal; but the Bill of Rights (which contains the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause and the First Amendment Freedom of Religion Clause)
was ratified in 1791. And in 1791, abortion was perfectly legal in
the United States (as it was when the Constitution was ratified
three years earlier), and it was largely ignored in England.101 Hence,
-PATIENT-FROM-HIS-FAMILY-IN-ORDER-TO-KILL-HIM [https://perma.cc/E4CHVY
2H]. On December 9, the Hospital sought an application for custodial guardianship of
Mr. Dunn so as to enable them to terminate his life, thereby bypassing Mr. Dunn’s ex-
tension. Id. Methodist hospital invoked the Texas Advanced Directives Act, (signed into
law by Governor George Bush) “which allows the hospital to override medical directives
of a patient and provide only ten days’ notice before involuntarily withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment.” Id. The patient’s only recourse is to f ind another facility which
would offer him an ICU bed, a daunting proposition, given his lack of insurance. Id. See
also Attorneys Representing Chris Dunn Contest Methodist Hospital’s Attempt to Seize
Guardianship, TEX. RIGHT TO LIFE (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.texasrighttolife.com
/attorneys-representing-chris-dunn-contest-methodist-hospital-s-attempt-to-seize
-guardianship [https://perma.cc/L8HNUYH7].
100. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839–40. Here, the Casey
Court directly contradicts the Court in Roe, which stated, “It perhaps is not generally
appreciated that the restrictive criminal abortion laws in effect in a majority of States
today are of relatively recent vintage. Those laws, generally proscribing abortion or its
attempt at any time during pregnancy except when necessary to preserve the pregnant
woman’s life, are not of ancient or even of common-law origin. Instead, they derive from
statutory changes effected, for the most part, in the latter half of the 19th century.” Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129 (1973).
101. GREGORY J. DURSTON, WICKED LADIES: PROVINCIAL WOMEN, CRIME AND THE
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLISH JUSTICE SYSTEM 168 (Cambridge Scholars Publishing
2014). See History of Abortion Law in the UK, ABORTION RIGHTS, http://www.abortion
rights.org.uk/history-of-abortion-law-in-the-uk [https://perma.cc/3V2LY4KS]; Abortion
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selecting a point source date of the Fourteenth Amendment to “mea-
sure” historical traditions is misleading—as well as arbitrary and
capricious—at best.102
Indeed, our founding fathers crafted a constitution that forever
would protect certain individual rights from the caprices and credos
of politicians, do-gooders and meddlers, whether on a state or na-
tional level. They did not specifically protect abortion—although
they did recognize the importance of guaranteeing security in one’s
home and person,103 which intuitively could be read to encompass
abortion.104 The answer to why the drafters did not specifically in-
clude abortion in its ambit of protective rights is simple—there was
no reason to do so, since it was legal in both America and Great
Britain at the time.105 No wonder it is challenging to find a constitu-
tional basis to permit abortion—since it was not illegal when the
constitution was ratified in the first place.
Only later would vigilante efforts to safeguard the morality of the
country under the guise of regulating personal conduct (e.g., contra-
ception, sodomy—and abortion), be implemented. This Victorian
prissiness106 emerges in the 1800s, as a wave of imposed morality
in Ancient History, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics/abortion/legal/history_1.shtml
[https://perma.cc/E74K4FNM].
102. Those Justices eager to strike down or diminish Roe seem woefully ignorant of
abortion history. Thus, Rehnquist’s rejoinder to Blackmun’s dissent in Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1988), is illustrative: “Justice Blackmun’s
suggestion . . . that legislative bodies, in a Nation where more than half of our population
is women, will treat our decision today as an invitation to enact abortion regulation
reminiscent of the Dark Ages not only misreads our views but does scant justice to those
who serve in such bodies and the people who elect them.” To be sure, abortion in the
“dark ages” was legal. Presumably, Rehnquist means to equate scaling back of abortion
to the dark ages of male chauvinism.
103. Nevertheless, that right could also be “aborted” under the Fourth Amendment,
if there is a reasonable basis to suspect a crime has been committed. And here’s the rub:
by crafting abortion as a criminal matter—although it infringes on a woman’s right to
the security of her own person—a state can circumvent the Fourth Amendment.
104. See Physically Intrusive, supra note 17, at 953.
105. HISTORY OF ABORTION, FEMINIST.COM, http://www.feminist.com/resources/our
bodies/abortion.html [https://perma.cc/EFN4RKYW] (citing ABORTION in OUR BODIES,
OURSELVES FOR THE NEW CENTURY 408 (1998)) (“In 1803, Britain first passed anti-
abortion laws, which then became [more strict] throughout the century. The U.S. fol-
lowed as individual states began to outlaw abortion. By 1880, most abortions were illegal
in the U.S., except those ‘necessary to save the life of the woman.’ But the tradition of
women’s right to early abortion was rooted in U.S. society by then; abortionists continued
to practice openly with public support, and juries refused to convict them.”).
106. Laura Cenicola & Mareike Aumann, British History 2: From the French Revo-
lution to World War II, Topic: “Majesties and Royal Highnesses,” (2008), http://www.laura
-cenicola.de/brithist2/brithist/8-1-introduction-into-victorian-morality-what-exactly-was
-the-victorian-era.html [https://perma.cc/674YJJT2] (“The term ‘Victorian’ owns a wide
range of connotations, most specif ically the high and strict moral standards. Nowadays
the Victorian time is usually associated with ‘prudishness’ and ‘represssion.’ ”). Queen
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took on a religious tone in the revivalism that swept the United States
in the 1820s and ’30s. The national mood expanded to include calls
for temperance. “In 1838, the state of Massachusetts passed a temper-
ance law banning the sale of spirits . . . set[ting] a precedent for such
legislation. Maine passed the first prohibition law in 1846, and a
number of other states had followed suit by the time the Civil War
began in 1861.”107 In 1873 The New York Society for the Suppression
of Vice was founded for the purpose of supervising the morality of the
public.108 It was granted powers to enforce laws that prohibited
transmissions of “obscene” or “immoral” mail, and society agents
were appointed by sheriffs as “peace officers.”109 By 1920, the reli-
gious fervor led to a Constitutional Amendment banning the manu-
facture and sale of alcoholic beverages.110 Only when prohibition
impacted the economy was the Eighteenth Amendment repealed.111
Over time, all such governmental incursions into private life were
regarded as antithetical to “The American Way” and rescinded (to
wit, Griswold v. Connecticut.)112 Except, that is, for abortion.
IV. IS IT LEGITIMATE FOR THE STATE TO PROTECT FETAL RIGHTS?
Perhaps, then, the basic problem in resolving the abortion con-
troversy is that there is a constitutional void regarding how to
handle it. To fill this legal void, one possibility is that judges employ
personal preferences, creating legal fictions like “potential people”
or “profound” interests to bolster a flawed approach. In fact, since
the court in Roe made a demonstrable, well-articulated and con-
certed effort to avoid basing their decision on personal beliefs, they
impliedly expressed concern that their personal beliefs (which in-
cludes religious background) might influence their decision had they
not taken caution to avoid it—including performing an extensive
(albeit not exhaustive) investigation of historical practices.113
Victoria reigned from 1837 to 1901, which pretty much coincided with the sudden
emergence of anti-abortion laws in the United States. See infra note 107.
107. Prohibition, HISTORY (2009), http://www.history.com/topics/prohibition [https://
perma.cc/KEQ25YB4].
108. Anthony Comstock, et. al, The Suppression of Vice, 135 THE N. AM. REV. 484,
484–85 (1882).
109. Id. at 485.
110. Prohibition, supra note 107.
111. American Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR.,
http://prohibition.constitutioncenter.org/exhibition.html [https://perma.cc/LM8T6PSN].
112. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965) (finding a state ban on contra-
ceptive use violates the Constitutional right to privacy in marital relations).
113. In their diligent efforts to avoid making the decision on personal views, the court
reviewed the practices throughout history, e.g. in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117, 130–47.
It is not clear, though, exactly why they made this detailed inquiry other than looking
for a way to assure themselves the decision was not based on personal opinion. Their
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In the absence of any demonstrable legal basis to regulate abor-
tion by the drafters of the Constitution, and in the absence of direct
guidance from that document, a second option to fill the void is for
natural law (the “moral code”) to dictate the standard—assuming we
can find some basis to craft such a moral law. However, should we
find that no natural or moral laws exists, i.e., that there is no con-
sensus of societal opinion, we must respect the woman’s right to
liberty and autonomy—allowing her to choose for herself how she
wants her body to be used.
That the judges in post-Roe cases were influenced by their reli-
gious notions masquerading as moral views is suggested by Professor
Geoffrey Stone114:
All five justices in the majority in Gonzales were Catholic. The
four justices who are either Protestant or Jewish115 all voted in
accord with settled precedent. It is mortifying to have to point this
out. But it is too obvious, and too telling, to ignore. Ultimately,
the five justices in the majority all fell back on a common argu-
ment to justify their position. There is, they say, a compelling
moral reason for the result in Gonzales. Because the intact D &
E seems to resemble infanticide it is “immoral” and may be pro-
hibited even without a clear statutory exception to protect the
health of the woman.”116
As the Court observed twenty-five years ago, “Some of us as
individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of
inquiry focused on the practices in ancient Persia, under Greek and Roman law, the
Hippocratic Oath, the Pythagorean notions, early common law, early British law, early
Christian theology including the views of Thomas Aquinas, St. Augustine Aristotle,
Galen, id. at n. 22, and the American Medical Association, id. at nn. 38, 39, concluding that
until relatively recently “a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a
pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage
of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this
choice was present in this country well into the 19th century. Even later, the law con-
tinued for some time to treat less punitively an abortion procured in early pregnancy.”
Id. at 140–41.
114. Geoffrey R. Stone, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Scalia and Our Six Catholic
Justices, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey
-r-stone/justice-sotomayor-justice_b_271229.html [https://perma.cc/PJD8NDWJ].
115. The current constituency of the Supreme Court includes f ive Catholic Judges and
three Jewish judges. See JNI MEDIA, Sotomayor: Too Many Catholics, Jews, on the
Supreme Court, BREAKINGISRAELNEWS (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.breakingisrael
news.com/65314/sotomayor-too-many-catholics-jews-supreme-court-jewish-world
[https://perma.cc/F3VB4YVK]. The death of the Catholic Justice Scalia leaves the scales
more equally balanced, added to the effect of Justice Sotomayor’s more feminist leanings
trumping any Catholic notions she might have.
116. Stone, supra note 88.
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morality, but that cannot control our decision. Our obligation is to
define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”117
A. Examination of Fetal Rights as a Determination of Its Status
While rejected as a determinant of the Roe decision, many pro-
ponents of the State’s interest over the future life of a fetus focus on
answering: when does life begin?118 While conservatives and Catho-
lics assert with perfect faith that the answer to this unscientific
question is it occurs at conception, others differ—seemingly based
on their religion or religiousity.119 I suggest it never gets fully re-
solved because the answer turns on a theosophical question. When
it does get (temporarily) answered—the outcome differs—seemingly
based on the prevailing religion of that state, or province, or coun-
try, or voter bloc,120 or on State policy.121 But because personal reli-
gious opinions cannot justify legal incursion into a woman’s freedom
to maintain her own body, another basis must be found. Thus, I inves-
tigate the possibility that the moral imperative may offer such basis.
117. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850
(1991). It must be noted, however, that Justice Rehnquist, the sole dissenter in Roe, was
Lutheran. See BIOGRAPHY.COM, William Rehnquist Bio., BIO. (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www
.biography.com/people/william-rehnquist-9454479#supreme-court-justice [https://perma.cc
/4AXK4EV5].
118. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1972) (“Some of the argument for this justi-
fication rests on the theory that a new human life is present from the moment of conception
[a justification rejected by the court]. . . . Logically, of course, a legitimate state interest in
this area need not stand or fall on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception or
at some other point prior to live birth.”).
119. Following its criminalization of abortion, in 1999, El Salvador amended the law
to include a declaration that life began at conception, with strong support from the
Catholic Church. See Nathalie Baptiste, In El Salvador, Abortion Laws Turn Pregnant
Women into Criminals, LATIN CORRESPONDENT (Oct. 15, 2014), http://latincorrespondent
.com/2014/10/el-salvador-abortion-laws-turn-pregnant-women-criminals [https://perma
.cc/96TP2PDR].
120. Compare Eur. Ct. H.R., R.R. v. Poland Summary in 2011-III, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions (2014) 209, 211 (holding that the doctors had breached the applicant’s
rights where a twenty-three-week pregnant woman, carrying a fetus with a genetic defect,
was denied an abortion because she had been denied an opportunity for genetic counseling
prior to the 22 week cut off allowing abortions in her home country of Poland and the
tests should have been carried out immediately after the suspicions arose) with A., B.
and C. v. Ireland, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2032, 46 (denying three women an unlimited right
to abortions on the grounds that Ireland, their home country had a recognized vested
right in criminalizing abortion). But see UNESCO Res. 33/36, annex, Universal Declaration
on Bioethics and Human Rights (Oct. 19, 2005) (outlining “Principles: 1. Human dignity,
human rights and fundamental freedoms are to be fully respected.; 2. The interests and
welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society”)
(emphasis added); G.A. Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, art. 16, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (Dec. 18, 1979).
121. Thus, compare Russia, Japan, China and Korea, infra Sec. IV.D.
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B. The Moral Imperative (Natural Law)
The first enumerated recognition of rights of a “potential” person
as a moral concern is found in Stenberg v. Carhart, which struck
down a Nebraska law prohibiting partial-birth abortion.122 Justice
Kennedy dissented, emphasizing what he described as the “conse-
quential moral difference” between the dilation and extraction method,
and other abortion procedures.123
Perhaps it can be said that a moral imperative governs “infrac-
tions” against humanity, that which we call “crimes” or “civil infrac-
tions.” By comparison, religious laws, even those governing conduct
between humans, are predicated on edicts of a divine entity. Under
a religious framework, these same acts are not crimes against human-
ity; they are sins against God.124 However, only if the predicate is
based on the moral code of humanity (described as a natural law)
can judicial action withstand legal scrutiny and be allowed to stand.
1. The Moral Imperative: An Overview
Because the Constitution is silent on the issue of abortion125 any
basis to regulate this private conduct must derive from one of these
two extra-legal contexts: religious views (based on teachings believed
122. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 914 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 962.
124. See Leviticus 19:16–18. Even loving one’s neighbor is seen, at least in Judaism,
as deriving from a Divine, rather than moral imperative. See Avi Weinstein, Be Loving
to Your Neighbor as You Would Yourself, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, https://www.jewish
virtuallibrary.org/jsource/Judaism/loving1.html [https://perma.cc/S6RTKHGA] (“Rabbi
Horowitz . . . a renowned Kabbalist . . . comments on ‘being loving to one’s neighbor. . .’
and equates it with loving God.”); see also REUVEN HAMMER, THE TORAH REVOLUTION:
FOURTEEN TRUTHS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 38 (2011).
125. Biblically speaking, when an authoritative document is silent on the legitimacy
or acceptability of a particular conduct, the default position is not necessarily “no.” This
is evident from the incident in Numbers where the daughters of Zelafachad (of the tribe
of Menashe) ask Moses to inherit their father’s property. See Numbers 27:2–7. While
biblical laws of inheritance provide for inheritance through the male line, it is silent on
whether, in the absence of male progeny, females can inherit. Rather than reverting to
the more conservative negative position, Moses, with the consent and advice from the
Almighty, rules that female inheritance is sanctioned where the descendent left no male
offspring and rules in favor of the Zelafchad plaintiffs. “G-d spoke to Moses as follows:
‘The daughters of Tzelafchad have spoken correctly. You shall certainly give them a land-
holding among their father’s brothers, and transfer their father’s inheritance to them.’ ”
Numbers 27:2–7. The stakes here were not simply the principle of inheritance, as many
assume. Rather, it is not unlikely that the portion in question included the magnificent
property of Dor Beach, see Joshua 12:23, and the Tribal Elders were drooling over get-
ting their hands on this prime piece of real estate.
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to be God-given), or some inherent conviction founded on the moral
fabric of the vast majority of human beings. Such “moral” views can
be considered legally legitimate if they are representative of the
societal collective and reflect a consensus of the absolute “wrong-
ness” of a particular act, such as murder, theft or adultery. Such
convictions, often termed the “moral code” or “natural law,” served
as the basis for the earliest legal codes, systematized in such works
such as Hammurabi’s Code, the Code of Justinian, or the Mosaic
Code (the Decalogue). While a religiously driven approach would be
barred under the First Amendment’s freedom of religion clause—
especially if the holding violates the tenets of another faith126—a
moral imperative that transcended individual religions or personal
views could be legally acceptable.
Morality, as defined by Aristotle, is premised on the greater
good,127 or as described in philosophy, ethics and political science as
126. The notion that partial birth abortions may be medically required and demanded
by non-Catholic women in certain circumstances seems to have been overlooked. It is
interesting to compare the attention given to the rights of Native Americans when they
conflict with the general “moral” views under The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). Thus, in the 1960s, the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment as banning laws that burdened a person’s exercise of religion,
which technically puts Gonzales in direct conflict with RFRA. Compare Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (reversing a finding that a woman fired for de-
clining to work on Saturdays for religious reasons was not entitled to unemployment
benefits) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234–35 (1972) (finding Amish and Men-
nonite parents were not required to send their children to formal high school which went
counter to their religious beliefs), with Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n.,
485 U.S. 439, 452 (1988) (Native Americans’ religious rights could not defeat a federal
road building and timber harvesting program); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872
(1990) (an employee terminated for religious peyote use did not qualify for unemploy-
ment benefits) (invalidated by State; the RFRA now applies only to federal law). The
case of Zubik v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 1544, 1560 (2015), which involves furnishing contra-
ception against a vendor’s will, is especially relevant here in that it seeks to determine
the reach of the RFRA, which states that the government may not impose a burden on
a person’s free exercise of religion, unless doing so furthers a “compelling governmental
interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb)(1). Justice Scalia’s views are particularly reprehensible
here. In a CBS interview, witing Jesuit moral manuals, he slipped in a religious view under
the guise of a moral stance. See CBS Interview by Lesley Stahl with Justice Antonin Scalia
(Apr. 27, 2008). The Court, by framing the issue (in an opinion with which Justice Scalia
joined) as “an important question of religion and moral philosophy . . . that has the effect
of enabling . . . an immoral act by another,” the Court remade the question into a mixed
moral-religious one before the court concluded that federal courts should not answer reli-
gious questions because they would in effect be deciding whether certain beliefs are flawed.
See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014).
127. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1–2 (Terrence Irwin, 2d. ed. 1999). See also
Philosophy 302: Ethics, Aristotle’s Ethics, PHILOSOPHY LANDER.EDU (Apr. 17, 2006), http://
philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/aristotle1.html [https://perma.cc/3ZGD3EDS] (“The good of
human beings cannot be answered with the exactitude of a mathematical problem. . . .
1. Ethics starts with actual moral judgments before the formulation of general principles.
2. Aristotle presupposes natural tendencies in people.” ).
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a common “good” shared and beneficial for all128 or most members
of a given community.129 This common good has sometimes been
seen as a utilitarian ideal, representing the greatest possible good for
the greatest possible number of individuals.130 “The practice of abiding
by societal laws is one of the most prevalent aspects of Aristotelian
justice. Aristotle assumed that in an ideal democracy, legislation
would embody the values that the society held as reflective of virtu-
ous action.”131
One way of examining whether the moral code—as a manifesta-
tion of the common good—is the driving force behind current abortion
regulation is by examining the confluence of ancient and archetypi-
cal codes of law, those transcending individual religions, which were
adopted by vast swaths of society and which left their mark on later
legal works—and current views. Another approach is to evaluate
current perspectives in advanced or industrialized countries and
compare intercountry variations. If the general standards governing
abortion throughout the world are basically similar, one can entertain
the proposition that societal morals (i.e., natural law) are governing
the decision-making. If they vary greatly, we must conclude that the
driving force regulating abortion is idiosyncratic cultural values or
nationalist religious views. As such, in the absence of any universal
moral view on abortion, its regulation should be dehors legal review.
2. Morality and Abortion: A Historical Approach
Some claim the prerogative for protecting fetal life centers on
rights of a “potential person,” yet unborn and only theoretically via-
ble, now residing within the personal domain of its mother.132 This
group asserts that the fetal-entity is so related to our concept of a
live human being that societal mores apply to determining its wel-
fare.133 In this vein, they claim that prohibiting taking a human life
128. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 246 (1971).
129. See Robert Cavallier, Meta-ethics, Normative Ethics, and Applied Ethics. Online
Guide to Ethics and Moral Philosophy, http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/cavalier/80130/part1/sect
4/KantReading.html [https://perma.cc/DXS3LU2A] (describing those reasons as self ishly
motivated).
130. See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 41 in MILL’S UTILITARIANISM: TEXT AND
CRITICISM (James M. Smith & Ernest Sosa, eds., 1969).
131. Sarah Tischler Aikin, Just Violence: An Aristotelian Justification of Capital Punish-
ment, CAL. STATE UNIV. AT CHICO, http://www.csuchico.edu/pst/JustViolence.htm [https://
perma.cc/T6TK2GLU]; see also ARISTOTLE, supra note 127, at 68.
132. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that “Life Begins at
Conception,” 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 599–600 (1991).
133. See The Grounds of Moral Status, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Mar. 14, 2013), http://seop.illc.uva.nl/entries/grounds-moral-status [https://perma.cc/Q4
Y3FRU7].
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applies equally to this potential-person, and hence the act of abor-
tion is considered murder.134 Because the prohibition against murder
is a generally accepted natural law, the pro-lifers argue that killing a
fetus (an innocent pre-person)135 falls into the category of (non-de-
fensible) murder, and hence is subject to criminal regulation. Be-
cause it is asserted (without scientific proof) that this entity, which
has yet to take one breath of air into its lungs has been invested
with a human soul, it is now not one whit different from you or me,
and hence entitled to the same degree of protections and justice af-
forded all humans. While these arguments are tainted with religious
innuendo, it remains to be seen whether there is a moral compo-
nent, independent of religion, which might justify these arguments.
a. The Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu
From earliest times, civilized society enumerated acts it consid-
ered abhorrent and reprehensible, and hence punishable. Even when
differences existed amongst primitive societies (largely reflective of
the national or prevalent religion), certain commonalities existed,
amongst them prohibitions against unwarranted killing of another
human being. Among the oldest codes (predating Hammurabi’s) is the
Sumerian Code of Ur-Nammu, written sometime between 2100 and
2050 BCE136 That code states, “[i]f a man commits a murder, that
man must be killed.”137 This precept did not apply to fetal protection.
b. Hammurabi’s Code
Often cited as the basis of all codes of societal conduct, Ham-
murabi’s Code,138 written shortly before 1800 BCE and about three
hundred years after Ur-Nammu, is the earliest preserved codifica-
tion of human behavior. It is commonly cited for its almost visceral
condemnation of murder with multiple provisions prohibiting the
act, reiterating a seeming primordial programming.139 Significantly,
134. See Introduction to the Abortion Debate, BBC (2014), http://www.bbc.co.uk/ethics
/abortion/philosophical/introduction.shtml [https://perma.cc/F7TGH6CP].
135. A purely Catholic notion.
136. See Joshua J. Mark, Ur-Nammu, ANCIENT HISTORY ENCYCLOPEDIA (June 16,
2014), http://www.ancient.eu/Ur-Nammu [https://perma.cc/GXU8G36B].
137. Code of Ur-Nammu.
138. Jane McGrath, What’s So Important About the Code of Hammurabi?, HOWSTUFF
WORKS (Feb. 17, 2009), http://history.howstuffworks.com/historical-events/code-of-ham
murabi.htm [https://perma.cc/6DLBHUG6].
139. See, e.g., The Code of Hammurabi §§ 209–211, THE CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://
www.constitution.org/ime/hammurabi.htm [https://perma.cc/5FTKFUQQ]. Contra Michael
H. Reggio, History of the Death Penalty, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages
/frontline/shows/execution/readings/history.html [https://perma.cc/2CSLMYN6].
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Hammurabi’s code does not consider abortion as murder; feticide is
regarded as a property right, compensable according to the stature
of the “owner”—the woman bearing the fetus:
If a man strike a free-born woman so that she lose her unborn
child, he shall pay ten shekels for her loss. . . . If a woman of the
free class lose her child by a blow, he shall pay five shekels in
money. . . . If he strike the maid-servant of a man, and she lose
her child, he shall pay two shekels in money.140
While many of the tenets of the Code are recognized by today’s
society (to wit, the provisions regarding judicial misconduct or medi-
cal malpractice, albeit perhaps not punished as harshly),141 the provi-
sions regarding feticide are in stark contrast to those advocated by
the Catholic Church, pro-life groups or recent Supreme Court rul-
ings on abortion. Thus, we see that feticide, at least according to
Hammurabi, was not considered murder; the fetus was considered
neither a human, nor even alive.142 For all intents and purposes, it
was regarded as property—throughout its gestation.143 To be sure,
recklessly damaging property of another was contemptible, and in
fact the Code of Hammurabi provides ample punishment—but it
was not considered murder.144
c. The Mosaic Code (The Decalogue)
The Mosaic Code (alternatively called the Decalogue or the Ten
Commandments) was revealed circa 1450 BCE, and certainly no
later than 600 BCE for those who eschew Divine Revelation.145 It
provided for both sins against the Deity and crimes against human-
ity. Regulation of the two were different, and civil crimes were dealt
with in separate sections of the Bible146 and resolved by a civil
140. The Code of Hammurabi, supra 139, at §§ 209, 211, 213.
141. See CHARLES F. HORNE, Introduction (1915), in ACADEMY FOR ANCIENT TEXTS,
http://www.ancienttexts.org/library/mesopotamian/hammurabi.html [https://perma.cc
/W3AT73H2] (“The judge who blunders in a law case is to be expelled from his judgeship
forever, and heavily f ined. The witness who testif ies falsely is to be slain. Indeed, all the
heavier crimes are made punishable with death . . . .’ ” ).
142. See The Code of Hammurabi, supra note 140, at § 211.
143. Id. §§ 209, 211, 213.
144. See, e.g., id. § 120.
145. See The Ten Commandments, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica
.com/topic/Ten-Commandments [https://perma.cc/QCY3TZ6P].
146. Exodus 21:35–36 (ox cause of damages); Exodus 21:33 (pit cause of damages);
Exodus 22:4 (crop destroying beast cause of damages); Exodus 22:5 (conflagration cause
of damages) (codified in THE MISHNAH 503 (Jacob Neusner trans., Yale University Press
1988); in the section dealing with civil damages for tort liability, called , the Hebrew
word used today for “torts.”).
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judiciary, while religious infractions were tended to by the priestly
class.147
Mosaic Law has been adopted by the Catholic, Greek Orthodox,
and Protestant Churches (and many non-believers). Yet, it, too, does
not equate feticide148 with killing a human149: The law of homicide in
the Torah, found in Exodus 21:12, reads, “He who smites a man . . . .”
According to the Talmud, which refers to Lev. 24:17, the passage
from Exodus includes any human person, defined as a one-day-old
child (with the presumption of a full-term pregnancy), but excludes
the fetus because the fetus is not a person until it is born.150 Mosaic
Law treats injury or death to the fetus as does the Code of Ham-
murabi. Thus, Exodus 21:23 denies capital crime status to feticide
in Jewish law:
[I]f men strive [fight], and hurt a woman with child, so that her
fruit depart, and yet no harm follow; he shall be surely fined,
according as the woman’s husband shall lay upon him; and he
shall pay as the judges determine. But if any harm follow [i.e.,
she is killed], then thou shalt give life for life . . . .151
And while, from a religious point of view, most rabbis treat abortion
in a most serious manner (unless the mother’s life or health is
imperiled—in which case abortion is required), halakhah (Jewish
Law) tells us that even if not performed to save the life or protect
the health of the mother, abortion remains a noncapital sin and not
tantamount to murder.152
d. The Justinian Code
The Justinian Code was written in about 530 CE, a millennium
or so after the Mosaic Code was enacted.153 It was a compilation of
147. The Chapter of Jethro in the Book of Exodus. See Exodus 18:21–23.
148. Aryeh Spero, A Talmudic Overview of Abortion, MIDSTREAM 20, 22 (1990) (noting
some would allow abortion on the grounds of mental anguish as late as the end of the
second trimester. Thereafter, only danger to the life and physical health of the mother
would suffice). Nevertheless, there is no question that before forty days the fetus is not
considered a person; at best it enjoys quasi-person status.
149. For an excellent treatise of the comparison of the Jewish Law on abortion and the
teachings of the Catholic Church, see Leila Bronner, Is Abortion Murder? Jews and Chris-
tians Will Answer Differently, LILITH (1997–98), http://lilith.org/articles/is-abortion-murder
[https://perma.cc/F3TZ2K44].
150. Accord id.
151. Exodus 21:22 (ASV).
152. See Bronner, supra note 149.
153. See Code of Justinian, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/topic/Code-of-Justinian [https://perma.cc/SM2A6UYN].
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a complex of earlier works, especially those created in 438 CE by the
Roman Emperor, Theodosius II, adopted by Valentinian and intro-
duced before the Roman senate.154 Under Justinian’s aegis, the works
of Theodosius II and Constantine I combining both Greek and Roman
legal tradition were systematized.155 Influenced by his wife, Theodora,
Justinian also provided for a more exalted status of women than
seen previously, including the establishment of property rights.156
Justinian was prescient enough to elucidate the differences be-
tween what is now referred to as civil laws, i.e., those inherent to a
particular nation which integrate legal, cultural and historical influ-
ences, and those pertaining to natural law, i.e.,
[T]hat which she has taught all animals; a law not peculiar to the
human race, but shared by all living creatures, whether deni-
zens of the air, the dry land, or the sea. Hence comes the union
of male and female, which we call marriage; hence the procre-
ation and rearing of children, for this is a law by the knowledge
of which we see even the lower animals are distinguished.157
While the impact of the Ecclesiastical Courts of the Catholic Church
during the period between 700 and 1000 cannot be underestimated,158
the Justinian Code served as the model for most of Europe’s laws
until the twelfth century.159
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. Matthew Barrett, Women’s Rights in the Byzantine Empire, CHAMPLAIN COLLEGE
(Apr. 16, 2015), http://globalconnections.champlain.edu/2015/04/16/womens-rights-in-the
-byzantine-empire [https://perma.cc/F49GT4X8].
157. Medieval Sourcebook: Corpus Iuris Civilis, 6th Century, FORDHAM UNIV. (1996),
http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/corpus1.asp [http://perma.cc/N74CG4NA] (citing
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 3–5 (B. Moyle trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1986)).
158. THOMAS G. BLOMBERG & KAROL LUCKEN, AMERICAN PENOLOGY: A HISTORY OF
CONTROL 15 (2010).
159. See Paul Halsall, Medieval Sourcebook, The Institutes 535 C.E., FORDHAM UNIV.,
http://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.asp [https://perma.cc/MGM6
Q23P] (“Under the direction of Tribonian, the Corpus Iurus Civilis [Body of Civil Law]
was issued in three parts, in Latin, at the order of the Emperor Justinian. The Codex
Justinianus (529) compiled all of the extant (in Justinian’s time) imperial constitutiones
[sic] from the time of Hadrian. It used both the Codex Theodosianus and private collec-
tions such as the Codex Gregorianus and Codex Hermogenianus. The Digest, or Pandects,
was issued in 533, and was a greater achievement: it compiled the writings of the great
Roman jurists such as Ulpian along with current edicts. It constituted both the current
law of the time, and a turning point in Roman Law: from then on the sometimes contradic-
tory case law of the past was subsumed into an ordered legal system. The Institutes was
intended as [a] sort of legal textbook for law schools and included extracts from the two
major works. Later, Justinian issued a number of other laws, mostly in Greek, which were
called Novels.” ) (brackets in original); see also THEODOSIAN CODE, THE COLUMBIA ENCY-
CLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2001) (“Latin Codex Theodosianus, Roman legal code, issued in 438 by
Theodosius II, emperor of the East. It was at once adopted by Valentinian III, emperor
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The Code explicitly recognizes that killing is permissible under
certain enumerated circumstances, and not all killing was equated
with murder: “To kill wrongfully is to kill without any right: conse-
quently, a person who kills a thief is not liable to this actio, that is,
if he could not otherwise avoid the danger with which he was threat-
ened.”160 Nor is a person made liable by this law who has killed by
accident, provided there is no fault on his part, for this law punishes
fault as well as willful wrong-doing.”161 More specifically, the Justin-
ian code rejects the notion that feticide is per se outlawed—at least
prior to forty days of gestation—because fetuses under forty days
did not have souls.162 This finding is consistent with the concept that
feticide would not constitute human killing prior to that point in
time.163 One might argue, then, that under Justinian the rights of
the unborn fall into a category that interfaces the domains of human
and property—referred to as “usufructus”164—or the right of using
and taking the fruits of things belonging to others, so long as the
substance of the things used remains. It is a right over a corporeal
thing, and if this thing perish, the usufructus itself necessarily per-
ishes also.165 This concept suggests that saving the endangered life
of the mother terminates any status the fetus might have enjoyed.
It took a thousand years for Justinian’s views of feticide to be
rejected by the Church—and then only for a three-year period.166
This occurred in the sixteenth century when Pope Sixtus handed
of the West. The code was intended to reduce and systematize the complex mass of law
that had been issued since the reign of Constantine I. To a large extent it was based upon
two private compilations, the Gregorian (Codex Gregorianus) and the Hermogenian (Codex
Hermogenianus). The Theodosian Code was used in shaping the Corpus Juris Civilis.”).
160. ANCIENT HISTORY SOURCEBOOK, Doc. 10—Justinian, The Institutes (c. 535 CE)
http://courses.wccnet.edu/~jrush/121source10.html [http://perma.cc/K8T82KY9].
161. Halsall, supra note 159.
162. Julia Neuberger, Embryos and Ensoulment: When Does Life Begin?, 365 THE
LANCET 837 (Mar. 5, 2005), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736
(05)71025-4.pdf.
163. But see id. at 838.
164. Some recognition of rights accruing to the unborn exists under the Code under
the laws of inheritance. JUSTINIAN, THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 28 (Charles H. Wade trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1904).
165. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 16 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 1917) (“A person
is ingenuus who is free from the moment of his birth, by being born in matrimony, of
parents who have been either both born free, . . .” ). Given the testament given to the
Natural Law as the f inal arbiter of human social intercourse by Justinian, a foray into
the customs and practices of the animal world might be more authoritative than religious
proclamations of a latter-day Catholic cleric on matters pertaining to damage or injury
done to the unborn, an issue shared with the natural world, as opposed to the laws of
inheritance, a wholly human devised mechanism to distribute accumulated wealth.
166. See Lindsey Disney & Larry Poston, The Breath of Life: Christian Perspectives
on Conception and Ensoulment, ANGLICAN THEOLOGICAL REV. 271, 278 (2010), http://www
.anglicantheologicalreview.org/static/pdf/articles/disney-poston.pdf.
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down the edict that ensoulment began at conception.167 Sixtus’ de-
cree was rescinded less than three years later by Pope Gregory
XIV.168 St. Thomas Aquinas’ (1224–1275) view, however, was consis-
tent with Justinian’s.169
Neither historical legal or moral codes, then, reflect the view that
the fetus has any rights superior to its mother. Nor does history doc-
ument a legally protected fetal right to be born—and surely never
before forty days of gestation. In sum, even if the mother’s life or
health is not endangered, Jewish law regards abortion as a sin and
not a crime (as would murder have been),170 under Hammurabi’s
Code it is regarded as neither, and in Justinian’s code only after
forty days would any actionable rights lie.171
C. Current Views of “The Greater Good” as a Determinant of
Morality
An overview of current international laws informs us that the
fetus’ “right to be born” varies too widely from year to year, from coun-
try to country, and from judge to judge to generate a consensus repre-
senting the values of the greatest number of human beings. Thus, no
universally accepted moral view can be said to exist on the interna-
tional platform today. Further, if some (any) moral or natural law con-
sensus did exist, we should expect similarities—presumably based
on some objective standard such as viability,172 (generally given in
legal literature as around the twenty-second or twenty-third week
of pregnancy).173 In other words, if “morality” were informing the
laws, we should see some overarching similarity in abortion rulings
throughout the world.
We don’t.
The parameters for allowable abortion vary drastically from
country to country. In six countries, the fetus enjoys an absolute
right to be born, and any right to life a woman may have—whether
to life, health or the pursuit of happiness—is subordinated to the
fetus’ right to be born.174 In some sixty countries, for at least a period
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See DAVID ALBERT JONES, THE SOUL OF THE EMBRYO: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE STATUS
OF THE HUMAN EMBRYO IN THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 73 (2004). Even Pat Buchanan, an
avid proselyte of pro-life thinking admitted this to the author in a personal conversation
at the University Club of Washington, D.C. (Nov. 29, 2007).
170. See Bronner, supra note 149.
171. WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS: FROM
AUGUSTUS TO CHARLEMAGNE 99 (1890).
172. See, e.g., Burton v. Florida, 49 So. 3d 263, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
173. See, e.g., R.R. v. Poland, [2011]-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 209 ¶ 203.
174. The Holy See, Dominican Republic, Malta, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Chile do not
allow abortion under any circumstances. See Devon Haynie, Countries Where Abortion
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of time during the pregnancy, abortion is allowed on demand (i.e.,
because the mother wishes it and proof of medical or health or family
welfare reasons is not necessary).175 Interestingly, these time limits
vary drastically ranging from ten weeks in Portugal176 to twenty-
four weeks in parts of the United Kingdom (the Isle of Man)177 and
Singapore.178 Yet it is difficult to believe a Portuguese fetus can reach
personhood at ten weeks, but that the fetus must wait another three
months before it achieves the same status if its mother lives in
Singapore.179 It is hard to accept that a Chilean woman has such a
poverty of rights that she can never obtain an abortion under any cir-
cumstances (even with consequently high suicide rates in pregnant
women, which some attribute to the absolute criminalization on abor-
tion),180 while in Spain her wishes govern entirely—at least until the
fetus reaches a gestational age of fourteen weeks. These facts sug-
gest that fetal attainment of “personhood” varies by nationality—a
is Illegal Under Most Circumstances, U.S. NEWS & WORLD (Feb. 8, 2016), http://www.us
news.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-02-08/10-countries-where-abortion-is-illegal
-under-most-circumstances [https://perma.cc/NQ73QW4X].
175. Angela Baglini, Gestational Limits on Abortion in the United States Compared
to International Norms, CHARLOTTE LOZIER INST. 1, 5 (2014), https://lozierinstitute.org
/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/American-Report-Series-INTERNATIONAL-ABORTION
-NORMS1.pdf.
176. Europe’s Abortion Rules, BBC News (Feb. 12, 2007), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi
/europe/6235557.stm [http://perma.cc/8X8WGLXE]. See also The Rights of the Unborn
Child and Artificial Procreation, Teachings of the Catholic Church on Abortion, PRIESTS
FOR LIFE (Ian Gavin trans.), http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/rightsofunborn
child.htm [https://perma.cc/E5S8P7SU].
177. See Grégor Puppinck, Abortion in European Law: Human Rights, Social Rights,
and the New Cultural Trends, 4 AVE MARIA INT’L L. J. 29, 30–31 (2015) (“The central
question was, and still is, whether or not the unborn child is a person within the meaning
of Article 2, protecting ‘[e]veryone’s right to life.’ The [European] Court [of Human Rights]
has kept this question open in order to allow the States to determine when life begins,
and therefore, when legal protection should start. On the one hand, the Court permits each
State, within a ‘margin of appreciation’ to determine ‘when the right to life begins.’ On
the other hand, the Court since Brüggemann and Scheuten v. FRG and R. H. v. Norway
has always refused to exclude the unborn from the scope of the Convention’s provisions
by declaring the unborn is not a person within the meaning of the Convention”) (internal
citations omitted).
178. AWARE (ASSOCIATION OF WOMEN FOR ACTION AND RESEARCH), http://www.aware
.org.sg/abortion [http://perma.cc/NQA44DYP]. Singapore imposes a requirement for pre-
abortion counseling, but “[b]efore 17 April 2015, non-Singaporean women, or women with
three or more children, or women who have not passed the PSLE and have no secondary
education were not obliged to undergo pre-abortion counselling, but new guidelines make
counselling mandatory for all patients.” Id. See also Guidelines on Termination of Preg-
nancy, SINGAPORE MINISTRY OF HEALTH 1, 4 (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.moh.gov.sg/con
tent/dam/moh_web/Legislations/Legislation%20And%20Guidelines/TOP_Guidelines
%202015.pdf.
179. Europe’s Abortion Rules, supra note 176.
180. Mexico, Italy, Canada, UK, Singapore, the Netherlands, India, Sweden. Id. See
Reva B. Siegel, The Constitutionalization of Abortion, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COM-
PARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1057, 1074 (May 2012), https://www.law.yale.edu/sys
tem/files/documents/pdf/Faculty/Siegel_ConstitutionalizationAbortion.pdf.
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logically untenable position which undermines obiter dicta about
fetal personhood in American cases.
Where extenuating circumstances impact the regulations (tak-
ing into consideration comparative rights of the mother, such as situ-
ations in which she is allowed to abort the fetus beyond the point of
viability)—we find even greater variation. Sixty-eight countries allow
for late-term abortion when the mother’s life is at stake. Another
fifty-seven deign to protect the mother’s health at the expense of
fetal viability. Yet an additional fourteen countries allow for the fetus’s
existence to be terminated for socioeconomic motives.181 Additional
exceptions are recognized in other countries (e.g., rape, incest, fetal
birth defects and the well-being of the family) but these also vary by
country, although industrially advanced countries are more lenient
in allowing abortions than African and less developed countries.182
Again, a unified moral basis for these gross differentials is wanting
and there is no consistent common good for all, to justify the across-
the-board variation.
If the predicate for abortion restrictions arises from a moral
perspective, it is difficult to accept a gross variation exists in when
a fetus attains “personhood,” the predicate for many of these regula-
tions. Thus to argue that “morality” is the governing rubric for sanc-
tioning a State’s right to supervise the right of the fetus to be born
is untenable.
D. Does Religion Influence a State’s Decision to Regulate Abortion?
I have shown that the rubric of the common good or morality,
evaluated historically, chronologically and geographically, has insuffi-
cient concordance and is insufficiently uniform to sustain a morally
based “legitimate interest” by the State over a fetal right to be born.
We need to find a different driver. As noted earlier, Professor Stone
postulates that decisions regarding abortion are religiously driven.183
Consequently, I now examine whether the geographic differential
has a basis in religion, and whether this accounts for the differential
in regulations.
Religious tenets pertaining to abortion generally are predicated
on the timing of ensoulment. The Catholic and conservative belief is
that human life (i.e., investiture of the soul) occurs at conception, driv-
ing the notion that abortion is prohibited from that moment on. Other
181. Louise Finer & Johanna B. Fine, Abortion Law Around the World: Progress and
Pushback, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 585, 585 (2013).
182. The World’s Abortion Laws, supra note 9.
183. See Stone, supra note 114.
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religions believe the soul invests at forty days after conception,184 a
concept reflected in some country’s laws.185 Still, other views claim
that soul investiture occurs at the moment of quickening, generally
between fourteen weeks and eighteen weeks,186 this can also be seen
in a few countries’ regulations.187 It remains to be seen whether
there is any correlation between prevalent religious views and a
country’s abortion regulations.
1. Abortion in Catholic Countries
a. The Six Absolutist Countries—And Ireland
A surprising discrepancy in abortion policy is found among Cath-
olic countries. In six overwhelmingly Catholic countries—and only
in Catholic countries—is abortion forbidden (and criminalized) under
all circumstances (even to save the mother’s life).188 Along with The
Holy See and Malta,189 where religious law is the official law of the
land, and the Dominican Republic where the population is overwhelm-
ingly Catholic (90%), Chile, Nicaragua and El Salvador subscribe to
these draconian abortion laws.190 In the latter three countries, the
population identifying themselves as Catholic hovers around 55 and
184. Julia Neuberger, Embryos and ensoulment: when does life begin?, THE LANCET
(Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736%2805%29
71025-4.pdf. Justinian’s view that ensoulment occurs at forty days has parallels in
Kaballistic lore, which holds that on that date a divine voice goes forth and proclaims the
intended mate for the prospective soul. See id.
185. Saudi Arabia, which follows Sharia law, allows abortion until the fourth month
if the life of the mother is in danger—but it also provides certain broader allowances for
abortion until the fortieth day. See infra note 239.
186. MALCOLM I. LEVENE, ET AL. ESSENTIALS OF NEONATAL MEDICINE 8 (3rd ed. 2000).
187. Hungary, Romania, Spain, Germany, Switzerland and Austria allow abortion until
at least the twelfth week; Sweden allows abortion until the eighteenth week. Europe’s
Abortion Rules, supra note 176. Islamic countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia allow
abortion if the mother’s life is at stake until the sixteenth or eighteenth week (the timing
of investiture of the soul according to Islam). See infra note 239.
188. Julia Calderone, Here are the 6 Countries where a woman cannot have an abortion
even if it will save her life, TECH INSIDER (Oct. 8, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.10
/pew-research-countries-abortion-save-life-2015-10 [https://perma.cc/H4CSFRQY].
189. Constitution of Malta, art. 2, ¶ (1)–(3) (stating that the religion of Malta is the
“Roman Catholic Apostolic Religion” (¶ 1), that the authorities of the Roman Catholic
Church “have the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and wrong” (¶ 2)
and that religious teaching of the Roman Catholic apostolic faith “shall be provided in
all [s]tate schools as part of compulsory education” (¶ 3)).
190. Chile: Extreme Anti-Abortion Law Creates Climate of Fear and Substandard
Health Care for Women, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 28, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en
/press-releases/2015/09/chile-extreme-anti-abortion-law-creates-climate-of-fear-and-sub
standard-health-care-for-women [https://perma.cc/4LA3M8LP].
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58%191 and hence it is difficult to understand the driving force of
religion on abortion practice in these countries, a feature warrant-
ing further investigation. In Ireland, Catholic constituents comprise
84% of the population.192 Ireland is also overwhelmingly religious
(indicated by church attendance).193 Here abortion is available—but
only if the mother’s life is at stake.194 Although Ireland does not
prevent pregnant women from traveling to neighboring England for
an abortion,195 counseling facilities which would facilitate this option
are unavailable, effectually foreclosing or at least strongly curtailing
this abortion alternative.196 The Irish approach should be contrasted
with the British, where the official religion is Anglican (Protestant)
and abortions laws are among the most liberal in the world,197
allowable where the life or health of the pregnant woman or other
existing children of the family are at risk—until the twenty-fourth
week of pregnancy.198 Theoretically the approval of two physicians
is needed, a requirement often dispensed with in practice.199
191. See Religion in Latin America, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www
.pewforum.org/2014/11/13/religion-in-latin-america [https://perma.cc/F23QUYSV].
192. Paul Hyland, Number of Catholics at Record High, Despite Lowest Percentage Ever-
CSO, thejournal.ie (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.thejournal.ie/religious-statistics-census
-2011-640180-Oct2012 [https://perma.cc/KRZ2WQFD].
193. ‘One in 10' Attends Church Weekly, BBC NEWS (Apr. 3, 2007), http://news.bbc.co
.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6520463.stm [https://perma.cc/872KW45E].
194. See A, B and C v. Ireland, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 187.
195. See Henry McDonald, No Extending Abortion Act to Northern Ireland, First Female
Leader Says: DUP’s Arlene Foster Vows to Retain Almost Total Ban on Terminations—but
Agrees to ‘Carefully Consider’ Court Ruling on Rape, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2016). https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/no-extending-abortion-act-to-northern-ireland
-first-female-premier-arlene-foster-court-ruling-rape [https://perma.cc/M34Q26XP].
196. See A, B and C v. Ireland, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 185, 196–97, 216 (describing the
necessity to travel elsewhere for abortion procedures).
197. See Abortion Act 1967, c. 87, sec. 1 (Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov/uk/ukpga/1967
/87/pdfs/ukpga_19670087_en.pdf (“[A] person shall not be guilty of an offence under the
law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a registered medical practi-
tioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good faith—
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the continuance
of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated, of
injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman or any existing children
of her family; or (b) that the termination of the pregnancy is necessary to prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or (c) that the
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman, greater
than if the pregnancy were terminated; or (d) that there is a substantial risk that if the
child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seri-
ously handicapped.”).
198. Id. (emphasis added).
199. Prolife Alliance v. British Broadcasting Corporation [2002] EWCA (Civ) 297 [6]
(Eng.). Lord Justice noted, “There is some evidence that many doctors maintain that the
continuance of a pregnancy is always more dangerous to the physical welfare of a woman
than having an abortion, a state of affairs which is said to allow a situation of de facto
abortion on demand to prevail.” Id. ¶ 6.
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b. The Reverting Catholic States: Now Abortion Is
Allowed—Now It Isn’t
i. Poland
Poland’s population is overwhelmingly Catholic,200 and abortion
is generally banned.201 Exceptions, however, do exist, such as where
the woman’s life or health is endangered, when the fetus is seriously
malformed (both requiring physician certification), and when the
pregnancy is a result of a criminal act (requiring certification by the
prosecutor).202 By contrast, before the fall of the Soviet Union when
the country was under Communist rule, abortion was both legal in
a wide variant of circumstances, such as where birth would create
“difficult living conditions,” 203 and well-utilized. Some estimates of
pregnancies terminated by abortion during the Communist era prior
to 1989 run as high as 50%.204
Nevertheless, the current milieu respects some maternal rights.
In two cases where abortion was legal but denied (one being a rape
200. “Catholic 87.2% (includes Roman Catholic 86.9% and Greek Catholic, Armenian
Catholic, and Byzantine-Slavic Catholic .3%), Orthodox 1.3%.” See INDEX MUNDI, Poland
Religions (June 30, 2015), http://www.indexmundi.com/poland/religions.html [http://
perma.cc/9DJWTZPS] (citing the CIA WORLD FACTBOOK); Susan A. Cohen, Nepal Reforms
Abortion Law to Reduce Maternal Deaths Promote Women’s Status, THE GUTTMACHER
REPORT ON PUB. POLICY REV. (May 2002), http://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/f iles
/article_files/gr050213.pdf (“Other than Poland, which reversed its long-standing policy
in 1997 and outlawed abortion in most circumstances, no country has restricted its abor-
tion law in any significant way in many years.” ).
201. See Donald Snyder, Poland Debates Proposal to Ban all Abortion, NAT’L CATHOLIC
REPORTER (July 13, 2016), https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/poland-debates-proposal
-ban-all-abortion [http://perma.cc/N58NBF7X].
202. Id.
203. See Population Policy Data Bank, POPULATION DIV. OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS
OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT 38 (“A law adopted by the Polish Parliament
(Sejm) on 27 April 1956 (Law No. 61) further liberalized the abortion laws by permitting
abortion on medical grounds, if the pregnancy resulted from a criminal act or because
of ‘diff icult living conditions’. . . . [S]erious defects of the unborn child often constituted
‘diff icult living conditions.’ . . . [A]ccess to abortion after the passage of the 1956 legislation
remained largely constant until 1990 with the election of the . . . non-Communist
Government . . . Under regulations issued by the [new, non-Communist] Ministry of Health
and Social Welfare (Ordinance of 30 April 1990), a request for an abortion on the grounds
of difficult living conditions had to be approved by two gynecologists and a general
practitioner. The pregnant woman was also required to obtain the counselling of a State-
approved psychologist. . . . In 1993, Parliament . . . eliminate[d] entirely ‘diff icult living
conditions’ as a ground for . . . legal abortions. Henceforth, abortions could be performed
legally only in cases of serious threat to the life or health of the pregnant woman, as at-
tested by two physicians, cases of rape or incest confirmed by a prosecutor, and cases in
which prenatal tests, confirmed by two physicians, demonstrated that the foetus [sic] was
seriously and irreversibly damaged [and only up to a twelve week limit].” ).
204. Drusilla Menaker, 33 Years After Legalizing Abortion, Poland Is Pressured to
Reconsider, LOS ANGELES TIMES (June 4, 1989), http://articles.latimes.com/1989-06-04
/news/mn-2570_1_anti-abortion-leader-roman-catholic-poland-dr-zof ia-kuratowska
[https://perma.cc/5JXKU5MM].
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case,205 and one where the child was born with a genetic defect),206 the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the women’s rights of
Respect for Private and Family life and the right to Liberty and Secu-
rity were breached, and the women were awarded compensation.207
ii. Russia
Until recently, Russian law guaranteed women freedom in
relation to reproduction and reproductive health. However, this
right has been slowly but steadily undermined. The forces be-
hind this trend are actively seeking to dramatically change cur-
rent legislation. . . . 
For decades, Russian women could have abortion up [until] week
12 of pregnancy; between 12 and 22 weeks, medical or social
grounds were required . . . [but] [i]n mid 2011,208 a group of
Parliamentarians teamed up with Russian Orthodox Church
activists [41% of the population are Russian Orthodox, while
13% are Atheist] and announced their desire to ban abortions,
and the new version of the health law with restricting amend-
ments was introduced. . . .209
While the resurfacing respect for religion seems to play a role
in the clamping down on abortion rights in Russia, the decline in
population (often attributed to devastating socioeconomic conditions)
205. Press Release, European Court of Human Justice Registrar, Teenage Girl Who
Was Raped Should Have Been Given Unhindered Access to Abortion ECHR 398 (Oct. 30,
2012) (stating the courts ruling that a teenage girl who was raped should have been given
unhindered access to an abortion) (“[I]n the case of P. and S. v. Poland (application no.
57375/08), which is not f inal, the European Court of Human Rights held that there had
been . . . violations of . . . [the] (right to respect for private and family life) of the European
Convention on Human Rights, as regards the determination of access to lawful abortion
in respect of both applicants. . . . It further held . . . that there had been: A violation of
Article 5 § 1 (right to liberty and security) in respect of P., and a violation of Article 3
(prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) in respect of P.”) (emphasis added).
206. R.R. v. Poland, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 828, ¶ 9.
207. See id. ¶ 224–25.
208. Lyubov Vladimirovna Erofeeva, Traditional Christian Values and Women’s Repro-
ductive Rights in Modern Russia—Is a Consensus Ever Possible? 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1931, 1931 (2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3828703 [https://perma
.cc/ED7XND4U]. In mid-2003, the government dramatically limited the number of per-
missible grounds for the first time. Id. (“[I]n 2009, the Guidelines on Psychological Pre-
Abortion Counseling . . . published by the Ministry of Sports, Tourism, and Youth Policy
of the Russian Federation, Federal Agency for Youth Affairs . . . abortion is treated as ‘a
murder of a living child.’ A woman willing to undergo abortion is assessed here as being
“mistaken and deluding herself,” whereas pregnancy and childbearing are treated as a
woman’s destiny. The authors . . . recommends [sic] that psychologists show patients
graphic movies on abortion.”). See infra note 211.
209. Id.
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and shrinking fertility rates may be a more potent driving force for
government initiatives.210
c. The Liberal Catholic Jurisdictions
i. Italy, France and Mexico City
Other jurisdictions with a high percentage of Catholics have far
more relaxed views. Mexico City211 and Italy, both with an 88% Catho-
lic population, allow abortion until the twelfth week of pregnancy
(although other states in Mexico still retain draconian laws criminaliz-
ing the practice except in cases of rape).212 While technically Catholi-
cism is the primary religion in France213 (polls claim between 50%
and 80% of the French identify themselves as Catholic), the religious
practice of the country belies this fact: 32% of the French population
described themselves as agnostic, a further 32% were self-described
atheists, and only 27% believed in any type of God or Supreme
Being.214 It is perhaps this lack of religiosity215 that explains the
liberal French views—where abortion is legal on demand up to twelve
weeks after conception.216 Abortions at later stages of pregnancy are
210. Id.
211. Allyn Gaestel & Allison Shelley, Mexican Women Pay High Price for Country’s
Abortion Laws, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/global-devel
opment/2014/oct/01/mexican-womenhigh-price-abortion-laws [https://perma.cc/MZF4LM
7Y] (“Mexico City was the f irst area in the country to decriminalize abortion.”). “In 2007
the Mexico City federal district passed a law making abortion legal and free in public
health centres in the first 12 weeks of pregnancy. Since then, more than 100,000 abortions
have been carried out . . . .” Id. See also Abortion Rights Around the World—interactive,
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/ng-inter
active/2014/oct/01/-sp-abortion-rights-around-world-interactive [https://perma.cc/ESD8
VK8Z]; Davida Becker & Claudia Díaz Olavarrieta, Decriminalization of Abortion in
Mexico City: The Effects on Women’s Reproductive Rights, 103 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 590,
590 (2013) (“Shortly after being passed, the law was challenged in the Mexican Supreme
Court. . . . but in August 2008, the Supreme Court voted to uphold the law.”).
212. Gaestel & Shelley, supra note 211 (“Mexico has some of the strictest abortion
laws in the world. In many states abortion is a punishable offence. At least 679 women
were reported or sentenced for the crime of abortion between 2009 and 2011, . . . Some
women, . . . have been accused of murder after suffering a miscarriage.”).
213. But cf. Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation de Églises et de l’État
[Law of December 9, 1905 concerning the separation of Church and State], Journal
Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Off icial Gazette of France] (Dec. 9, 1905).
214. Harris Interactive, Religious Views and Beliefs Vary Greatly by Country, According
to the Latest Financial Times/Harris Poll, PR NEWSWIRE (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.pr
newswire.com/news-releases/religious-views-and-beliefs-vary-greatly-by-country-according
-to-the-latest-financial-timesharris-poll-57217417.html [https://perma.cc/2YMNQRL8].
215. See Religion Important for Americans, Italians Says Angus Poll, ANGUS REID
GLOBAL MONITOR (Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.italystl.com/ra/2996.htm [https://perma.cc
/A46KCTPQ] (comparing religiosity of France to other European countries and the United
States).
216. Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in France, ANGLOINFO, https://www.anglo
314 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:271
allowed if two physicians certify that the abortion will prevent grave
permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman, a risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or that the child will
suffer from a particularly severe illness recognized as incurable.217
ii. Canada
Notwithstanding a 40% Catholic population, Canada has one of
the most liberal abortion laws in the world: the decision remains one
made by a woman and her doctor.218 The history of abortion in Canada
is virtually the opposite of the United States. America began with no
restrictions, while early in Canadian history all abortions were
illegal.219 In 1969, abortion was legalized in Canada, but only when a
committee of doctors agreed it was necessary for the physical or men-
tal well-being of the mother. But in 1993, the (mostly Protestant)
Supreme Court of Canada ruled in R. v. Morgentaler that the exist-
ing laws were unconstitutional and struck down the 1969 law.220
Conservatives continue to try (unsuccessfully) to pass new restric-
tive laws.221
2. Abortion in Israel
Perhaps not surprisingly, Israel, where Jewish law predominates,
is relatively lenient.222 Abortion is obtainable upon request with the
permission of a three-person medical committee (which is freely given
info.com/riviera/how-to/page/france-healthcare-pregnancy-birth-termination-abortion
[https://perma.cc/SVQ43LPD].
217. See Abortion Legislation in Europe, THE LAW LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 1, 13, 32, 37
(Jan. 2015), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/abortion-legislation/abortion-legislation.pdf
(also describing later authorizations in Russia and Ukraine).
218. See CHRISTINE AMMER & JOANN E. MANSON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S
HEALTH 7 (6th ed. 2009).
219. Abortion in Canada, THE WILBERFORCE PROJECT (2016), http://thewilberforceproj
ect.ca/resource-centre?task=view&id=6 [https://perma.cc/M3B8B9K8].
220. R. v. Morgentaler, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 463, 464–65 (Can.).
221. Abortion in Canada, supra note 219.
222. Debra Kamin, Israel’s Abortion Law is Among World’s Most Liberal, THE TIMES
OF ISRAEL (Jan. 6, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/israels-abortion-law-now-among
-worlds-most-liberal [https://perma.cc/E3MQG5RA]. Most Jewish commentators do not rec-
ognize the fetus as a “person” until after birth. See Spero, supra note 148, at 22 (“Judaism’s
position is as far removed from the pro-abortion slogan claiming a woman has a right to
control her body even to the extent of destroying a fetus as it is from the Catholic posi-
tion which would compell [sic] a woman to forfeit her life for the sake of the fetus. All in
all, Judaism displays a middle approach, balancing the aforementioned compelling needs
of the mother with a respect for the right of the fetus, as life, to travel uninterrupted to
its ultimate destination: birth.”). Spero asserts that one thing is unequivocally certain,
the father’s [along with the mother’s] rights over the fetus are considered property rights.
Id. Spero also acknowledges that mental anguish of the pregnant woman can suffice to
allow the procedure, preferably earlier on in the pregnancy. Id.
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in practice; only two per cent of requests are denied), rigid time con-
straints are not imposed, and criminalization has been non-existent,
at least in practice. Israeli law, however, does not apply to its Muslim
population, where family matters are governed by Sharia law.223
3. Abortion and Greek Orthodoxy
Greece is relatively lenient.224 This is surprising considering the
comparative stringency of Greek Orthodox religious law which holds
that, “[t]he only time the Orthodox Church will reluctantly acqui-
esce to abortion is when the preponderance of medical opinion de-
termines that unless the embryo or fetus is aborted, the mother will
die.” 225 Yet, Greece allows abortion on demand where the pregnancy
has not exceeded twelve weeks.226 In the case of rape or incest, an
abortion can occur as late as nineteen weeks, and as late as twenty-
four weeks in the case of fetal abnormalities.227
4. Abortion in Hindu Countries: India and Nepal
In India, Hindu law228 applies to the majority of the
population.229 However, the religious view is relatively tolerant,
which is reflected in civil practice. “The Vedas teach that all life is
sacred. However, human life is the highest level of consciousness. The
223. Yuksel Sezkin, Conference on Religious Law and Democracy, BAR ILAN UNIV.
(Dec. 2016).
224. See GREECE, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 1, 2, http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza
tion/171697.pdf (“[T]he [Greek] government recognizes the canon law of the Orthodox
Church, both within the church and in areas of civil law such as marriage” and finan-
cially supports the Orthodox Church. “Privileges . . . granted to the Orthodox Church
[are] not routinely extended to other religious groups.”).
225. Stanley S. Harakas, The Stand of the Orthodox Church on Controversial Issues,
GREEK ORTHODOX ARCHDIOCESE OF AMERICA, http://www.goarch.org/ourfaith/contro
versialissues [https://perma.cc/TSN629P3]. War is only justif ied when a nation defends
itself to protect the lives of its citizens against the offenders in an unjust war. Killing
anything is forbidden. See also George Mastrantonis, The Ten Commandments, GREEK
ORTHODOX ARCHDIOCESE OF AMERICA, http://www.goarch.org/ourfaith/ourfaith7115
[https://perma.cc/2URE2XUV].
226. Abortion Legislation in Europe, supra note 217, at 34. Girls under the age of 18
must get written permission from a parent or guardian before being allowed an abortion.
Id.
227. Id.
228. The Hindu Ethic of Non-Violence, KAUAI’S HINDU MONASTERY, https://www.himala
yanacademy.com/readlearn/basics/ahimsa-nonviolence [https://perma.cc/3Q5P4CF2] (“Yoga
Sutras, sage Vyasa defines ahimsa as ‘the absence of injuriousness (anabhidroha) toward
all living beings (sarvabhuta) in all respects (sarvatha) and for all times (sarvada).’ ”).
229. Indian law, THE ENCYLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/print
/article/285760 [https://perma.cc/NNT8PR4C].
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divine spark, or soul enters at 120 days (Artma). Hindus also perform
a pre-birth ceremony at 7 months when personhood is fully achieved2.”30
Hence, it is not surprising that abortion in India is legal up to
twenty weeks231 on a showing that the continuance of the pregnancy
involves a risk to the life of the pregnant woman, or of grave injury
of physical or mental health, or “there is a substantial risk that, if
the child were born, it would suffer from such physical or mental
abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.” 232
Nepal, also a Hindu state (81% of the population identify them-
selves as Hindu), is even more lenient in its practice: abortion is
available on demand up until twelve weeks and until eighteen weeks
in cases of rape or incest.233
5. Abortion in Islamic Countries
We find similar disparities among countries identifying them-
selves as Islamic. Jordan,234 Iran,235 Egypt and Syria generally allow
abortion only if the mother’s life is endangered.236 Iran allows abor-
tion in cases of birth defects,237 and Iraq sometimes in cases of rape
230. The Status of the Human Embryo: Key Facts—Personhood, UNIV. OF MARYLAND,
http://embryo-ethics.smd.qmul.ac.uk/key-facts/personhood, [https://perma.cc/J6UFXCTY];
S. CROMWELL CRAWFORD CHAPTER 1: DILEMMAS OF LIFE AND DEATH: HINDU ETHICS IN A
NORTH AMERICAN CONTEXT (1995).
231. Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in India, ANGLOINFO, https:/www.anglo
info.com/india/how-to-page/india-healthcare-pregnancy-birth-termination-abortion
[https://perma.cc/VUE6J3DT].
232. CRAWFORD, supra note 230, at 32.
233. Nepal 2012 International Religious Freedom Report, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE 1, 1
(2012), https://photos.state.gov/libraries/nepal/391216/misc_pdf/Final.pdf; Susan A. Cohen,
Nepal Reforms Abortion Law to Reduce Maternal Deaths, Promote Women’s Status, 5
GUTTMACHER POL’Y R. 1 (“The parliament of Nepal voted overwhelmingly in March [of
2002] to legalize abortion in that country up to 12 weeks of pregnancy and as late as 18
weeks in cases of rape or incest. The Nepali action continues the worldwide trend toward
liberalization of countries’ abortion laws.”).
234. Jordan, UNITED NATIONS (2002), http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications
/abortion/doc/jordan.doc.
235. The World’s Abortion Laws, supra note 9.
236. Id.
237. See K. M. Hedayat et al., Therapeutic Abortion in Islam: Contemporary Views of
Muslim Shiite Scholars and Effect of Recent Iranian Legislation, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 652,
654–55 (2006). Iran, like Poland, is another country where abortion laws track the change
from a secular government to a religious one. After the Khomeini revolution, abortion
rights were changed to follow Islamic Sharia law “where . . . formation of the fetus’s life
is divided into two stages: before the fetus is infused with life and after . . . Before the
fetus has a soul, abortion is legal if pregnancy endangers the mother’s life. . . . Imam
Khomeini [was asked] . . . if abortion was legal (before the fetus has a soul) . . . where
doctors are certain or when they fear that the continuation of pregnancy would kill the
mother. . . . Imam Khomeini said not only it is legal but it is also necessary. Even though
in penal code, abortion is considered a crime, when it is done to save the mother’s life
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or incest.238 Saudi Arabia allows limited abortion availability until
four months after conception.239 By comparison, the Islamic coun-
tries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan (whose Islamic populations range from 56% in Kazakstan,
93% in Turkmenistan, to 84% in Tajikistan and 96.3% Uzbekistan)
allow abortion on demand until the twelfth week of pregnancy.240
Yet, in Malaysia, abortion is both restricted and heavily criminal-
ized.241 Abortion in Turkey is legal until the tenth week after the
(before the fetus is infused with life), it is regarded as legal. . . . After the Islamic
Revolution and the ruling of Islamic (particularly Shia) laws, the life stages of the fetus
were taken into consideration. . . . As was mentioned earlier, fetus develops in two
stages: before it has a soul and after it. ‘After the fetus has a soul’ means the time when
signs of life can be seen in the fetus. Based on science and the sayings of Imams, the
fetus is infused with life after the 4th or 4.5 month (16 to 18 weeks) of pregnancy and
because killing any live human being is a crime, abortion after this time is a great sin
and crime.” Farokhzad Jahani, Abortion in Iranian Law, IRAN CHAMBER SOC’Y (Jan.
2004). In April 2005, the Iranian Parliament approved by the Council of Guardians eased
the conditions by allowing abortion on medical proof of fetal abnormalities such as anen-
cephaly (i.e., where the child cannot survive) exist, or where they produce diff iculties for
the mother to take care of, such as major thalassemia or bilateral polycystic kidney
disease) before the nineteenth week of pregnancy. See Hedayat et al., supra note 237.
238. Iraq, POPULATION DIV. OF THE DEP’T FOR ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECRETARIAT, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/Key_Findings_WPP
_2015.pdf.
239. Ministerial Resolution No. 218/17/L, MINISTRY OF HEALTH (June 26, 1989) §2, art.
24 (“A physician is prohibited to perform an abortion of a pregnant woman unless an
abortion is deemed the only course of action that is apt to save her life. Nevertheless, a
physician may perform an abortion if the pregnancy is less than four months old and it
is proven beyond doubt that continued pregnancy gravely endangers the mother’s health
provided such facts are supported by a resolution of a medical committee . . . . [T]he
Committee of Senior Ulema stipulated as follows: (1) Pregnancy in any of its stages may
not be aborted except when legally (according to Islamic laws) justified and within very
narrow limitations. (2) In the first forty days of pregnancy, and if abortion is deemed
necessary to accomplish a legal benefit or to prevent an expected harm, abortion may be
allowed. However, abortion is not allowed during this state for fear of hardship in child
upbringing or inability to secure cost of living, education or future or if the parents
decide that they have enough children. (3) Abortion in the embryo stage is not allowed
unless an approved medical committee decides that continuation of pregnancy endangers
the mother’s safety and could possibly lead to her death. In such cases, abortion shall be
allowed if all means to eliminate the danger are exhausted to no avail. (4) After the third
stage where pregnancy is over four months, abortion is not allowed unless and until a
panel of approved specialists diagnose that continuation of pregnancy will cause the
mother’s death and all means to eliminate the danger are exhausted to no avail.” ).
240. Mapping the Global Muslim Population, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population23 [https://
perma.cc/7N3XCUMJ]; Abortion Policies: A Global Review, UNITED NATIONS DEP’T OF
ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/pro
files.htm [https://perma.cc/6Q7FP2T4].
241. See Anees Syafwah, Legal Issues of Abortion in Malaysia, ACADEMIA.EDU, https://
www.academia.edu/7691081/Legal_Issues_of_Abortion_in_Malaysia [http://perma.cc/G9
S87X49] (“Section 312 of the Penal Code states that a termination of pregnancy is per-
mitted in circumstances where there is risk to the life of the pregnant woman or threat of
injury to her physical or mental health . . . [I]t is the doctor alone who makes the
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conception, although that can be extended to the twentieth week if
the pregnancy threatens the woman’s mental and/or physical health
or if the conception occurred through rape.242
6. Abortion in the Orient: Taoism, Buddhism, Shintoism and
Atheism
The variation does not escape the Eastern religions243: China,244
North Korea and Vietnam,245 whose population is divided between
Taoists, Buddhists and atheists (communists) have relaxed views on
abortion. In fact, the Chinese are so proactive in promoting abortion,
that they force it on Tibetans.246 A liberal but somewhat less relaxed
view is found in Hong Kong247 and Taiwan,248 which have more diverse
decision as to whether a termination should be carried out.”). See also Misconceptions,
REPROD. RIGHTS ADVOCACY ALL. OF MALAY. (RRAAM), http://www.rraam.org/issues/mis
conceptions/ [https://perma.cc/J6YQGYQA] (citing a 2007 survey f inding that only 57%
of 120 doctors and nurses surveyed knew that abortion is legal in certain circumstances).
242. However, a married woman must obtain her husband’s consent. See Contracep-
tion and Termination of Pregnancy/Abortion in Turkey, ANGLOINFO, https://www.anglo
info.com/turkey/how-to/page/turkey-healthcare-pregnancy-birth-termination-abortion
[http://perma.cc/QP4S7NRE].
243. Taiwan and Hong Kong (whose populations adhere to a mixture of the traditional
Eastern religions) have a restrictive view, and Tibet is incensed by the Chinese impo-
sition of abortion. See Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in Taiwan, ANGLOINFO,
https://www.angloinfo.com/taiwan/how-to/page/taiwan-healthcare-pregnancy-birth
-termination-abortion [http://perma.cc/CC62QXGA]; Termination of Pregnancy and
Abortion in Hong Kong, ANGLOINFO, https://www.anglo info.com/luxembourg/index.php
/hong-kong/how-to/page/hong-kong-healthcare-pregnancy-birth-termination-abortion
[https://perma.cc/G5NLFMS6]; China Forces Abortion, Sterilization on Tibetans, LIFESITE
(Aug. 2, 2000), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/china-forces-abortion-sterilization-on
-tibetans [http://perma.cc/3R8H4EXD].
244. China, POPULATION DIV. OF THE DEP’T OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS SECRETARIAT, http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/chinas1
.doc (“The Criminal Code of China (enacted by the National People’s Congress on 1 July
1979) does not contain any provisions under which abortion, performed with the consent
of the pregnant woman, constitutes an offence.”).
245. A 1989 law affirming the people’s right to choose contraceptive methods states
that: “Women have the rights to have abortion; to receive gynecological diagnosis and
treatment; and health check-up[s] during pregnancy; and medical service when giving
birth at health facilities.” Abortion in Vietnam, WOMEN ON WAVES, https://www.womenon
waves.org/en/page/4898/abortion-law-vietnam [http://perma.cc/N45WGEZJ].
246. China Forces Abortion, supra note 243 (relying on an August report in Jane
Magazine).
247. The religious climate in Hong Kong includes Buddhism, Taoism and Confucian-
ism, accentuated by local practices and beliefs. Forty-three percent of the population is
religious, and the majority of these follow Chinese traditional religions. Religion in Hong
Kong, INTERNATIONS.ORG, https://www.internations.org/hong-kong/religion-in-hong-kong
-15922 [http://perma.cc/28N4YELM].
248. In Taiwan, religious sects also include the Unification Church, Mormonism, and
Hinduism. Religion, DISCOVER TAIWAN (Aug. 2, 2016), http://eng.taiwan.net.tw/m1.aspx
?sNo=0002009 [http://perma.cc/X5P3CQ4V].
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populations.249 In these countries, abortion is available until twenty-
four weeks of pregnancy where the woman is under sixteen, in cases
of rape or incest, where the fetus has serious abnormalities, and
where the pregnancy will cause mental, psychological or physical
impact to the mother.250 In Taiwan, a married woman must obtain
her husband’s consent, and criminal penalties apply to both the
woman undergoing the abortion and the practitioner who performs
it.251 Yet, in South Korea, where religious practice is divided be-
tween non-religious and Buddhism (along with a smaller assort-
ment of Christian religions), abortions are mainly illegal252—at least
in theory253—except for health hazards to the mother, rape, incest
and cases where a parent has an inheritable disease.254
Japan, where a dominant religion is Shintoism, faces a totally dif-
ferent and anomalous situation. Here, at least “on the books” abortion
is illegal.255 However, for all practical purposes they are performed
249. Id. See Religion in Hong Kong, supra note 247. Hong Kong, however, has limited
requirements. See Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in Hong Kong, supra note 243
(outlining the requirements of an abortion in Hong Kong under the Offences Against the
Person Ordinance).
250. Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in Hong Kong, supra note 243.
251. Termination of Pregnancy and Abortion in Taiwan, supra note 243.
252. Jane Kang, To Abort or Not to Abort: That is the Question in South Korea, VOICES
IN BIOETHICS, https://voicesinbioethics.org/2013/10/14/abortion-south-korea [http://perma
.cc/QT6LHT4X] (“In 1953, the Korean Criminal Code made abortions illegal. In 1973, the
Maternal and Child Health Act allowed doctors to perform abortions within the f irst 28
weeks of pregnancy in cases of rape or incest, when a woman’s health is in danger, or when
a pregnant woman or her spouse has certain communicable or hereditary diseases. In 2009,
the abortion law in South Korea was revised so that the deadline for a legal abortion was
moved from 28 weeks to 24 weeks, and certain diseases (such as viral hepatitis) were re-
moved from the list of accepted reasons for abortion.”).
253. Woong Kyu Sung, Abortion in South Korea: The Law and the Reality, 26 INT’L J.
OF L., POL’Y. & FAM. 278, 278 (2012) (theorizing that “a deep-seated disregard for women’s
rights is behind recent abortion controversies in South Korean society” and places the
regulation of abortion in the context of political agendas, ideological positions, and cultural
values related to abortion).
254. See Kang, supra note 252. If a woman has an illegal abortion, she can be sen-
tenced to prison for up to a year and fined about $2,000, although these punishments are
rarely enforced. Nevertheless, “Korean women have expressed their desire to legalize
abortion, yet the government, the social expectations of women, and some groups in the
medical community hinder them from having this right to choose and being in charge of
their own reproductive capability. . . . In late 2009, a report on declining birth rates was
released by the Presidential Council for Future & Vision. In the Council’s report, various
suggestions for increasing the birth rate were proposed, one of them being an anti-abortion
campaign. At this point, the debate on abortion became much more heated, and legislators
were motivated to stringently enforce punishments for illegal abortions. . . . Due to a
significant decrease in fertility rates, the government now charges fees for family plan-
ning services, hoping this will discourage couples from practicing any form of birth
control. . . . From the early 1960s to late 1990s, the Korean government actually encouraged
women to get abortions to prevent overpopulation. The Korean government no longer
encourages abortions, but the abortion rate seems to have increased substantially.” Id.
255. Philip Brasor & Masako Tsubuku, Japanese Laws Make Abortion an Economic
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freely and no woman has been prosecuted for having an abortion since
World War II. Hence, they are effectively legal, albeit quite expensive
and generally not covered by national health insurance.256
E. Reconciling the Results
Looking at the international scene, there is no consistency in
abortion regulation associated either with official religion or the
preponderance of religious practice. This is the case whether the
determination is based on fetal viability or extenuating circumstances
of the mother: as far as predominantly Catholic jurisdictions, we
find six absolutely banning abortion,257 three which are quite lenient,
and many that span the middle range. We have Muslim countries
strictly limiting its performance and those which are liberal, both in
the conditions allowing abortions and duration of pregnancy when
it is allowed.258 Similar discrepancies are found in the Eastern reli-
gions. Perhaps the only consistency is that where atheism is (or was)
the state-endorsed religion, such as under Communism, abortion
regulations are (or were) quite relaxed.259 But, it is not only in those
countries where we find relaxed rules. We find them also in Canada
and in the United Kingdom and other industrialized countries.260
Otherwise, only two or three vaguely uniform factors are corre-
lative: abortion is overwhelmingly more available in developed coun-
tries where more than 90% of women can obtain abortion in most
circumstances, while in less developed countries only 50% have similar
access to abortion.261 In countries where the population considers
themselves religious, more restrictive abortion regulations apply.
And religiously—all religions viewed ensoulment, the sine qua non
of personhood, to occur at or after the fortieth day of gestation (or at
least they did at the inception of the religion’s development). Per-
haps we can also conclude that the most repressive abortion laws
are found in Catholic countries (or those where the majority of the
population is Catholic), even if this trend is not followed in Catholic
countries the world over.
Issue (May 13, 2012), http://blog.japantimes.co.jp/yen-for-living/japanese-laws-make-abor
tion-an-economic-issue [http://perma.cc/L4PFCY6T].
256. Id.
257. See supra Part IV.D.
258. See supra Part IV.D.5.
259. See supra Part IV.D.6.
260. See supra Part IV.D.1.c.
261. See supra Part IV.D.1.a.
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V. THE POINT OF PERSONHOOD
A. Is Killing an Embryo Murder?
We have already seen that the decisions around the world are
not uniform enough to be governed by “natural law.” However, the
lack of correlation between religious preferences of a country and its
regulations would negate the claim that religion, per se, is the driving
force. Nevertheless, given Professor Stone’s “painfully awkward
observation” that all the American Justices who voted to restrict
abortion in Gonzales were Catholic,262 we must examine whether
different religious teachings of the same denomination foster local,
idiosyncratic beliefs. Alternatively, it may not be a specific religious
denomination that is driving the decisions, but rather the degree of
religiosity of the adherents. The factors cry out to be examined in
systematic detail, revisiting this worldwide disparity with two ques-
tions in mind: (1) why is the worldwide differential in approach to
abortion so varied? and (2) is there any uniform and logical (moral)
basis for determining whether a fetus has any guaranteed right to
life? These issues, however, are outside the scope of this Article.
This Article does, however, raise a contextual basis for the dispa-
rate views. The challenge is to explain the arbitrary and capricious
nature of the far-flung results, noting that decisions driven by reli-
gious fervor or teachings would be banned under the First Amend-
ment. In other words, I question whether local cultural determinants
and/or personal religiosity of the judge or legislators have an impact
on decision-making.263
To reiterate, one basis for any moral argument derives from an
Aristotelian assessment of the enlightened society and its view of
“the common good.” “Claiming that virtually every code of civilized
human behavior includes a prohibition against murder,264 [pro-lifers]
argue that this precept should apply, as stated in the American
Pledge of Allegiance ‘for all,’ ”265 which they claim includes the fetus
262. Stone, supra note 88.
263. This view might perhaps explain the law in Greece, where the off icial religion is
the abortion-intolerant Greek Orthodox, but the law of the land is more forgiving. One
might hypothesize that perhaps the ancient Aristotelian concepts of abortion and person-
hood have had some type of “Jungian” impact.
264. Murder is defined as, “The unlawful killing of another human being without
justif ication or excuse.” Murder, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/murder
[https://perma.cc/L7H3ALQC].
265. Barbara P. Billauer, With Liberty and Justice for All: Abortion and the Consti-
tution (Oct. 31, 2008) n. 10 (available in PDF by author search on https://papers.ssrn
.com) (“The Pledge of Allegiance was written in 1892 by Francis Bellamy. . . . In 1940 the
Supreme Court, in . . . Minersville School District v. Gobitis, ruled that students in public
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from the moment of conception—which more properly would be the
embryo at that point. Surely, constitutions world-over routinely stipu-
late that every human person has a right to life, that human life is
not only sacred, but inviolable. No one, therefore, has the right to
take away human life; instead we have the duty to care for it, to
protect it and to defend it, as “[o]nly God is the owner and Master
of human life,” 266 although this concept has caveats as, for example,
in the case of self-defense. The question we face is whether killing
an embryo or a fetus—via abortion—can be considered murder from
a religious point of view; the notion of moral involvement having
been dispelled by the universal variance in abortion regulations.
Thus, notwithstanding intense proselytizing that human life begins
at conception,267 (by Supreme Court originalists or others) this simply
cannot be a “natural law” when modern “civilized” countries have
such varying viewpoints. However, if some religions so identify the
act as murder, this might be the identifier of the source of legal
decisions restricting abortion, as Professor Stone claims, a view that
must be rooted out.
Since investiture of soul (the rubric upon which religion de-
clares “personhood” and establishes when life begins) is not a natu-
ral phenomenon capable of being addressed by science,268 and since
it varies by religion, any legal determination of personhood based on
“ensoulment” must fail. Further, recognition of the consequences of
failure to provide for legal abortion requires Justices who would
impose obstacles to its use to be mindful of the dangers of such a
course of action (including danger and even death to the woman),
especially to women not of their religious persuasion.269 And it further
remains to be determined how the Judeo Christian religions—which
have a common legal source, i.e., the Decalogue—could have such
different views on the inception of “personhood” and the applicabil-
ity of the prohibition on murder.
schools should be compelled to recite the Pledge, even Jehovah’s Witnesses . . . who
considered the flag salute to be idolatry. . . . In 1943 the Supreme Court reversed its
decision, ruling in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette that ‘compulsory
unification of opinion’ violated the First Amendment”) (citations omitted).
266. Jude I. Ibegbu, Rights of the Unborn Child in International Law: Towards a
Current Convention Issues of International Law of Human Rights, http://groups.csail.mit
.edu/mac/users/rauch/nvp/misc/ibegbu.html [https://perma.cc/372MRW7Q].
267. JOHN L. MERRITT & J. LAWRENCE MERRITT II, WHEN DOES HUMAN LIFE BEGIN?
4–5 (2012).
268. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (pertaining to what is science,
junk science, and metaphysics).
269. See LAURA KAPLAN, THE STORY OF JANE: THE LEGENDARY UNDERGROUND FEMINIST
ABORTION SERVICE 88 (1995).
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B. Killing v. Murder: Back to the Source—A History of Biblical
Mistranslation
Historically, common law defined murder as “the unlawful kill-
ing of a human being with malice aforethought.” 270 The instances of
when killing is permitted and when it is considered murder have
been a subject of much religious as well as legal debate.271 Let us
assume that human life does begin sometime before actual birth.
And now let us re-ask: are we legally permitted to kill this entity,
and if so, until what point and under what conditions such that it
does not constitute murder?
If the embryo/fetus constitutes a human being, complete with
a divine soul from the moment of conception, killing it would be
prohibited,272 although if abortion is merely “killing,” certain excep-
tions would be allowed, such as, for example, self-defense, or preser-
vation of the life and health of the mother. On the other hand, if
abortion is “murder,” this definition forecloses the concept of com-
parative rights of the mother, since one cannot chose one life over
another.273 The Catholic position further holds that even “killing” is
prohibited, without allowances for exceptions,274 a prohibition which
applies even to an embryo/fetus. This exposition illustrates the
problem with commingling the concepts of killing and murder when
it comes to abortion, and this puts us in a troublesome legal bind.
The basis for the disconnect can be traced to the Sixth Com-
mandment of the Decalogue, (Catholic translation “Thou shall not
kill”).275 Thus, even if the act is not murder, it is still prohibited
270. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111 (West 2016).
271. See GERALD J. BLIDSTEIN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE CLASSIC JEWISH DISCUSSION,
Q.J. JEWISH LIFE & THOUGHT 2 (1965), reprinted in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT—A READER
107 (Glen H. Stassen ed., 1998); RASHBAM’S COMMENTARY ON EXODUS: AN ANNOTATED
TRANSLATION, 217–18 (Martin I. Lockshin ed., Scholars Press 1997); Ben-Tsiyon Segal,
The Ten Commandments in History and Tradition, HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM
(Gershom Levi trans. 1990).
272. Under these circumstances, Maimonides equates the fetus with a “pursuer” and
hence allows abortion as an act of the mother in self-defense. The Abortion Controversy:
Jewish Religious Rights and Responsibilities, THE UNITED SYNAGOGUE OF CONSERVATIVE
JUDAISM, http://www.uscj.org/JewishLivingandLearning/SocialAction/SocialJustice/Current
Issues/Political_SocialIssues/TheAbortionControversy.aspx [https://perma.cc/8NP6QLYL].
273. For a situation which occurred in El Salvador, see Nathalie Baptiste, In El Salvador,
Abortion Laws Turn Pregnant Women into Criminals, LATIN CORRESPONDENT (Oct. 15,
2014), http://latincorrespondent.com/2014/10/el-salvador-abortion-laws-turn-pregnant
-women-criminals [https://perma.cc/96TP2PDR] (“Between 2000 and 2011, 129 Salvadoran
women were charged with abortion-related crimes. Of those, 49 were convicted: 23 were
convicted of abortion and the rest received different degrees of homicide. According to
an extensive report by the Center for Reproductive Rights, the women on trial for abortion
routinely have other rights denied, including the right to due process—through practices
like preventive detention and inadequate access to legal representation—and the right
to privacy.”) (emphasis added).
274. Perhaps something akin to manslaughter.
275. The Fifth Commandment, Catechism of the Catholic Church, U.S. CONFERENCE OF
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according to the Catholic Church’s reading of it. This interpretation,
if valid, might even support the global restricting or banning of abor-
tion, even for non-Catholics, since the Ten Commandments are often
considered the heart of “natural” or “moral law.” 276
The Catholic understanding of the Decalogue, rendered as
“Thou Shalt Not Kill,” however, was born at least a thousand
years after its original Hebrew revelation was translated into Eng-
lish in 1611 as the King James Version.277 It was, according to Cath-
olic tradition, rearticulated by Jesus hundreds of years after its
initial declaration in the same fashion.278 A more authoritative ren-
dition would be a direct translation from the Hebrew279 and the
Hebrew Torah280 (and some Protestant Bibles)281 do not interpret the
Hebrew commandment as does the Catholic Church. Rather the
Hebrew words utilized in the Decalogue “Al Tirzach” 282 actually
CATHOLIC BISHOPS—LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA 544 (2016) http://ccc.usccb.org/flipbooks
/catechism/index.html#562 [http://perma.cc/Z6HXKJ7S] (citing Exodus 20:13 (King James)).
276. Moral laws derived from the Decalogue may not be embraced by Muslims, as the
Quran has its own version which supersedes any contrary views of the Old and New
Testaments. Thus the Third Commandment of the Quran states: “Kill not your children
because of poverty” and the Fifth Commandment states: Kill not anyone whom God has
forbidden.” Imam K. Mufti, Ten Commandments in the Quran (part 1 of 3): A Quick Intro-
duction, ISLAMRELIGION.COM (Mar. 19, 2012), http://www.islamreligion.cm/articles/5114
/viewall/ten-commandments-in-quran [https://perma.cc/W8LUUUL8].
277. Wayne Blank, The Decalogue, THE CHURCH OF GOD DAILY BIBLE STUDY, http://
www.keyway.ca/htm2004/20040316.htm [https://perma.cc/VE9FWE5Z].
278. Mark 10:17–19 (King James Version) (“And when He was gone forth into the way,
there came one running, and kneeled to him, and asked him, Good Master, what shall
I do that I may inherit eternal life? And Jesus said unto him . . . Thou knowest the com-
mandments, Do not commit adultery, Do not kill, Do not steal, Do not bear false witness,
Defraud not, Honour thy father and mother . . . .” ) (emphasis added).
279. For comparative translations, see The Ten Commandments of God, BIBLESCRIPTURE
.NET, http://biblescripture.net/Commandments.html [https://perma.cc/UK2CAGRN].
280. Exodus Chapter 20, MECHON MAMRE (2016), https://www.mechon-mamre.org/p/pt
/pt0.htm [https://perma.cc/Z9KKM3BF].
281. Ten Commandments from God Bible Study, CHRISTIAN BIBLE STUDY AND GAMES
(Mar. 24, 1998), http://www.biblestudygames.com/biblestudies/ten.htm [http://perma.cc
/8LQMXQXQ] (“Thou shalt not kill. [‘]Kill 7523 ratsach (raw-tsakh’); a primitive root;
properly, to dash in pieces, i.e. kill (a human being), especially to murder.[‘] This was a bad
translation, the word should be murder and not kill. There is a huge difference between
killing a person and murdering them . . . [See] Numbers 35:16–21.”).
282. Eliezer Segal, Thou Shalt Not Murder, FROM THE SOURCES, http://people.ucalgary
.ca/~elsegal/Shokel/001102_ThouShaltNotMurder.html [https://perma.cc/KFL7KBL2]
(“Don Isaac Abravanel . . . noted that ratsah [rezach] is employed in Numbers 35:27–30
both when dealing with an authorized case of blood vengeance, and with capital punish-
ment . . . . Rabbi Samuel ben Meir (Rashbam) and Rabbi Joseph Bekhor-Shor . . . ex-
plain[ed] that the Hebrew text refers only to unlawful killing. Both . . . pointed out
plainly the differences between the Hebrew roots for killing and murdering. (. . . Bekhor
Shor even provides a French translation of the latter term: meurtre), and brought ample
evidence of the Torah’s condoning other types of killing . . . . [Rashbam also notes] [a]nd
this is a refutation of the heretics, and they have conceded the point to me. Even though
their own books state ‘I kill, and I make alive’ (in Deuteronomy 32:39)—using the same
Latin root as for ‘thou shalt not murder’—they are not being precise.” ).
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mean283 “Do not murder!”—an injunction that applies to only live,
fully birthed humans—and only in certain circumstances, and al-
lows for various defenses. Thus this dichotomy in translating the
Sixth Commandment as prohibiting murder or killing becomes most
significant.284
The root of the word Tirzach derives from the word Rezach—a
pursuer,285 and is distinguishable from the Hebrew expression that
might signify a prohibition against killing—Lo Taharog286—precisely
because, not only is killing permitted in the proper context, but
under certain, albeit strictly circumscribed, circumstances287 it is
required.288 Such a situation might arise if killing the fetus must be
done to protect or preserve the mother’s health—and the only avail-
able manner would be akin to Gonzales’ outlawed D and X proce-
dure.289 Hence, where mandatory actions are involved, such as an
283. See Chart: Comparing the Ten Commandments, BELIEFNET , http://www.beliefnet
.com/faiths/2007/03/chart-comparing-the-ten-commandments.aspx [https://perma.cc/79A3
7J57] (listing the translation of the Hebrew in Jewish tradition as “thou shall not kill.”).
284. Berel Lang, You shall not murder, THE FORWARD (Jan. 9, 2004), http://forward
.com/articles/6091/on-language [http://perma.cc/9U2KVXLM].
285. RONALD H. ISAACS, EVERY PERSON’S GUIDE TO JEWISH LAW 145 (2000) (citing
Murder and the Preservation of Life, CODE OF MAIMONIDES, 1:9). This translation serves
as the basis for the views of Moses Maimonides, the Rambam, court physician to the
Caliph of Alexandria on abortion. The Rambam, an ardent follower of Aristotle, opined
that “the reason the life of the unborn child may be taken when it endangers the life of
the mother is based on the law of the ‘pursuer’. . . . In his code, Maimonides says: ‘This is,
moreover, a negative commandment, that we have no pity on the life of a pursuer. Conse-
quently, the sages have ruled that if a woman with child is having diff iculty in giving
birth, the child inside her may be taken out, either by drugs or by surgery, because it is
regarded as one pursuing her and trying to kill her.” Id. The Rambam, however, takes heed
to note that, “[O]nce its head has appeared, it must not be touched, for we may not set
aside one human life to save another human life, and what is happening is the course of
nature.” Id. Clearly by comparing the fetus to a pursuer whose interests are not considered,
we are in fact favoring the needs of one person (the pursuer) over another (the pursued).
286. ELIEZER SEGAL, ASK NOW OF THE DAYS THAT ARE PAST 60 (2005) (ebook) (“ ‘[K]ill’
in English is an all-encompassing verb that covers the taking of life in all forms and for
all classes of victims. That kind of generalization is expressed in Hebrew through the
verb harag. However, the verb that appears in the Torah’s prohibition is a completely
different one, rasah which, it would seem, should be rendered ‘murder.’ This root refers
specif ically to criminal acts of killing.”).
287. John A. Battle, What Does the Sixth Commandment Mean, 9 WRS J. 1, 8–10 (2002).
288. Another divergence in translation contributing to the differing viewpoints derives
from the word ason, or harm, as used in that statement, and mistranslated into form by
the Catholic clergy, meaning souless fetus. See Bronner, supra note 149, at 2–3. A similar
paradox arises with regard to animals. Killing animals is not only permissible, but is also
required to perform the sacrif icial rites. However, causing suffering to animals is strictly
prohibited, and is a prohibition contained in perhaps the earliest known codification of
human conduct, the Seven Laws of Noah. The Seven Noahide Laws, TRUE GRACE MINIS-
TRIES, http://www.auburn.edu/~allenkc/noahide.html [http://perma.cc/D47R82RN].
289. ISAACS, supra note 285, at 143 (“ ‘If a woman is having diff iculty giving birth, it
is permitted to cut up the child inside her womb and take it out limb by limb because her
life takes precedence. If the greater part of the child has come out it must not be touched,
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abortion to alleviate serious suffering or protect the life of a mother,
Judaic law would be in stark conflict with prevailing state laws that
prohibit, for example, partial birth abortion.290 The Catholic inter-
pretation of the commandment forbids killing of any innocent life,
interpreted to include the unblemished fetal entity, theologically
giving that entity superior rights to its mother, who at the very least
is guilty of what Catholics call “original sin.” 291 The Catholic view
then dovetails very well with the obiter dicta found in the Roe progeny
of cases—and resolves the conflicting rights issue posed at the outset
of this Article. Identifying this discrepancy brings into stark relief
the religious root of the anti-abortion (pro-life) vs. pro-freedom (pro-
choice) camps—and highlights the problems courts will face if their
unconscious religious programming directs judicial opinions.
C. A History of Biblical Mistranslation
In discerning the history of the mistranslation of “Thou Shalt Not
Murder” 292 into “That Shalt not Kill,” the position of St. Jerome—
who allows abortion under certain circumstances—also becomes
significant.
The Hebrew Bible was first translated into Greek via the Sep-
tuagint (drafted in the third century CE).293 The Greek version also
used the equivalent for “murder.” 294 But before it was rendered into
English, the Septuagint was translated into Latin (the Vulgate) by St.
Jerome (who, it must be recalled allowed abortion until forty days).295
because one life must not be taken to save another’ (Ahalot 7:6).” ). Rashi, a renowned
Hebrew sage of the Middle Ages, comments on the above passage: “For as long as it did
not come out into the world, it is not called a living thing, and it is permissible to take
its life in order to save its mother.” Id. at 144. Thus, according to Rashi, the reason that
it is permitted to take the life of the unborn child is that the fetus is not considered a
living thing and, hence, taking its life cannot be called murder.
290. ISAACS, supra note 285, at 145.
291. SEGAL, supra note 286, at 60 (“It is, of course, not just a question of etymology.
Those ideologies that adduce the commandment in support of their gentle-hearted causes
are compelled to feign ignorance of all those other places in the Bible that condone or
command warfare, the slaughter of sacrif icial animals, and an assortment of methods
for inflicting capital punishment.”).
292. Id.
293. Crawford H. Toy & Richard Gottheil, Bible Translations—The Septuagint, JEWISH
ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3269-bible-translations [https://
perma.cc/HV4RGFPX] (“The Pentateuch was translated at the time of Philadelphus, the
second Ptolemy (285–247 B.C.[E.]).” ).
294. The Greek Septuagint translation correctly translated the Hebrew word ratsah
into Greek with the Greek word for “murder.” Segal, supra note 282, at 60–63.
295. SEGAL, supra note 286, at 61–62 (“[T]he Vulgate . . . employ[s] the Latin verb
occidere, which has the sense of ‘kill’ rather than ‘murder.’ By demonstrating that the
Vulgate itself employed the root occidere in Deuteronomy, when the Almighty himself
is speaking of his own power over the lives of his creatures—in a context where it cannot
conceivably be rendered as ‘murder’—Rashbam aggressively proved the error of the
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The Latin Vulgate and subsequent early English translations of the
Bible used the term for killing.296 The King James’ version continued
rendering the prohibition as against “killing” as included in St.
Jerome’s Vulgate, the official version of the Roman Catholic Church.297
But, as Professor Segal writes: “This still raises some difficult ques-
tions about the Latin Vulgate translation. The author . . . Saint
Jerome298. . . spent much of his career in the Land of Israel, where
he consulted frequently with Jewish scholars whose interpretations
he often cites with great respect.” 299 St. Jerome knew both Hebrew
and Greek—and one wonders why he used the word akin to “killing”
for his Latin version. Professor Segel postulates that St. Jerome
substituted the word he felt most closely approximated the “turn the
other cheek” pacifism attributed to the early followers of Jesus.300
Interestingly, “St. Augustine, basing himself on the standard
translations, made it clear that the commandment does not extend to
wars or capital punishments that are explicitly ordained by God.” 301
St. Jerome who lived contemporaneously with St. Augustine, agreed.
And he extended the largesse to abortion, allowing the practice in
fetuses less than forty days old.302
traditional Christian understanding of the sixth commandment.”). See also Segal, supra
note 282.
296. Noting that it talks about “secretly killeth his neighbor or smiteth his neighbour
secretly rather than murder for the Latin clam percusserit proximum.” Murder, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Murder [https://perma.cc/R35VDQ27] (emphasis added).
297. Monk Preston, The Ten Commandments: Different Versions, THE PRAYER FOUNDA-
TION, http://www.prayerfoundation.org/ten_commandments_different_versions.htm [https://
perma.cc/5574ZRFG]. Some scholars have a slightly alternative history. See The Catholic
Church Changed the Ten Commandments?, FISH EATERS n.1, https://www.fisheaters.com
/10commandments.html#1a [https://perma.cc/4KYGSP6N] (“The Septuagint, the Latin
Vulgate (the off icial Scripture of the Church), and the original Douay-Reims phrase the
Fifth Word as ‘Thou shalt not murder;’ later Douay-Reims versions, such as the Challoner,
and the King James Bible, etc., phrase it as ‘Thou shalt not kill.’ ‘Thou shalt not murder,’
however, is the original intent and the meaning of the earliest texts. Catholics, of course,
have 2,000 years of Church teaching and the Magisterium to interpret Scripture, and the
meaning of the Fifth Commandment is that one is not to take innocent life. It doesn’t
entail pacif ism, ignoring the needs of self-defense and justice, worrying about squashing
bugs, etc.” ).
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died September 30, 420 AD, Bethlehem. St. Jerome, CATHOLIC ONLINE, http://www.catho
lic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=10 [https://perma.cc/BV48J6MK]. Augustine, born in
354 in Algeria, where he died in 430, likely embraced some of his views, including the
views on the permissibility of abortion prior to its becoming ensouled; Saint Augustine,
Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Saint-Augustine [https://
perma.cc/CDS4VSLH]. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, ENCHIRIDIAN: ON FAITH, HOPE, AND LOVE
¶ 85–86 (Albert C. Outler trans., 1955).
299. Segal, supra note 282.
300. Matthew 5:39.
301. SEGAL, supra note 286, at 62.
302. Roman Catholicism and Abortion Access, RELIGIOUSTOLERANCE.ORG, http://www
.religioustolerance.org/abo_hist.htm [https://perma.cc/WR9JD7NV].
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Augustine goes further. Believing, according to the science of
his day, that the body of a pre-born child “lacked sensation,” he
concluded that the child likewise lacked a human soul.303 He then
distinguished between a vivified and unvivified fetus (a fetus before
or after ensoulment), and since Augustine could not conceive of an
ensouled person without sensation, he concluded that abortion of a
“pre-vivifed” fetus, while a grave evil, could not be considered, in the
strict moral sense, a murder.304 As St. Augustine said, “the law does
not provide that the act (abortion) pertains to homicide, for there
cannot yet be said to be a live soul in a body that lacks sensation.”305
The views of St. Augustine and St. Jerome, then, turn both on differ-
entiating murder versus killing, as well as the timing of ensoulment
and attainment of personhood.
VI. FOR FURTHER RESEARCH: SCIENCE V. EMOTION
Although feticide does not achieve universal recognition as con-
stituting the crime of murder, pro-lifers have sought to create this
impression. This is reflected unfortunately in obiter dictum, where
one Justice, on the basis of unscientifically gathered petitions, opined
that those who have had abortions experience feelings of remorse or
regret.306 Before engaging in unsupported and emotional or anec-
dotal suppositions regarding any claimed adverse effects incidental
to abortion, it might be more productive to engage in scientific and
balanced inquiry, which includes assessing the comparative benefits
of the procedure. Thus, legal abortion has resulted in a decline in
maternal mortality.
According to South Africa’s National Committee of Confidential
Inquires into Maternal Deaths, liberalization in the country in
1996 led to a 91% decline in abortion-related maternal mortality
between 1994 and 1998–2001. One study showed an ‘immediate
positive impact on morbidity,’ in particular arising from infection,
and another concluded that a ‘cautious assessment of the magni-
tude of the reduction [in maternal mortality] confirms that it is
303. Robert Vasa, Modern Look at Abortion Not Same as St. Augustines, ETERNAL
WORD TELEVISION NETWORK, https://www.ewtn.com/library/bishops/vasapelosi.htm [https://
perma.cc/QK6WGPS5] (it could not be said whether the soul was yet present).
304. JOHN C. BAUERSCHMIDT, AUGUSTINE THROUGH THE AGES: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 1
(2009). See also SAINT AUGUSTINE, supra note 298.
305. Vasa, supra note 303.
306. Stephanie Pappas, Most Women Who Have Abortions Don’t Regret Them, LIVE
SCIENCE CONTRIBUTOR (July 15, 2015, 11:09 A.M.), http://www.livescience.com/51559
-women-abortions-don’t-regret.html [https://perma.cc/LYC8G67T].
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large.’ Evidence from Nepal, where revisions to the country’s
legal code in 2002 granted women the right to terminate a preg-
nancy up to 12 weeks without restriction as to reason and later
on specific grounds, suggests that liberalization has contributed
to a decline in complications from unsafe abortion. Following the
liberalization of Romania’s abortion law in 1989, maternal mor-
tality dramatically decreased.307
Chile, a country which criminalizes all abortions, is said to have the
highest suicide rate of pregnant women—precisely because they are
frightened and feel trapped,308 although research has obfuscated
causes of death from suicide as opposed to other causes.309 Neverthe-
less, some research states that all over maternal mortality has de-
creased.310 A more reliable study, however, comes from El Salvador,
another country that totally bans abortion. Here the statistics in-
dicate the huge suicide impact abortion has on the population.311
Further research into countries like Argentina and Brazil, both
with women leaders, might shed some additional light on the issue.
Indeed since Cristina Kirchner and her husband, Nestor, took power,
307. Finer & Fine, supra note 181, at 587 (citations ommitted).
308. MELISA Inst., The Chilean Abortion Paradox: Even When Prohibited by Law,
Abortion Rates Decrease, SCIENCE NEWSLINE MEDICINE (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.sci
encenewsline.com/news/2014110715400022.html [https://perma.cc/C9QTDG63] (“[R]e-
search suggests that women at high risk of abortion display a vulnerability profile marked
by coercion and fear, which together account for nearly 70% of the reasons for declaring
the intention to terminate the pregnancy.”). Notwithstanding the reduction in abortion
found in Dr. Koch’s research, from 2000–2004, abortion was the third highest cause of
maternal death! Enrique Donoso, Mortalidad Materna en Chile, 2000–2004, 71 REVISTA
CHILENA DE OBSTETRICIA Y GINECOLOGÍA 246, 246 (2006). As to why Chile might have
a higher suicide rate than the other countries banning abortion could be answered by the
difference in enforcement. Thus while Malta bans abortion, it is seldom prosecuted when
the mother’s life is in danger. See Elard Koch, A Ground-breaking Abortion Study from
Chile, LIFESITE (May 9, 2012, 11:59 AM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/a-ground
-breaking-abortion-study-from-chile%20(Plos%20One) [https://perma.cc/7E7Z5K9T]. See
also Baptiste, supra note 119 (reporting that suicide is the third highest cause of maternal
death during pregnancy).
309. See Elard Koch et al., Women’s Education Level, Maternal Health Facilities,
Abortion Legislation and Maternal Deaths: A Natural Experiment in Chile from 1957 to
2007, PLOS ONE (May 4, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal
.pone.0036613 [https://perma.cc/8U25NM9G].
310. Id.
311. Marginalized, Persecuted and Imprisoned: The Effects of El Salvador’s Total
Criminalization of Abortion, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS 1, 21 (Feb. 2014). The Report also
cites “[a] 2012 report by the director of Radio Yusca [that] found that, according to the
Ministry of Health’s Maternal Death Tracking System, suicide of pregnant women in El
Salvador represents the third most common cause of maternal death. Furthermore, sui-
cide has been similarly reported to account for 57% of the deaths of pregnant females
aged 10–19.” Id. (citations omitted).
330 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 23:271
abortion laws loosened. However, the implications of Brazil would
be harder to deconstruct, as the country is known for its reverence
of a woman’s physical beauty, Brazilian women have the highest
rates of Caesarian sections, and Brazilian plastic surgeons are world
renowned.312 Any conclusions about its relatively loose abortion laws
may be due to the aesthetic climate that promotes surgical interven-
tions, rather than the status of women.
CONCLUSION
The most compelling argument, then, to support a woman’s claim
to abortion would be on the basis of the right to religion (and to her
religious practice). In that the Catholic Church’s position on the legiti-
macy of killing a life form is vastly different than, say, the Jewish
view, and that this is the driving force between the morality ascribed
to the court’s positions, the litigant’s own view of the Sixth Command-
ment and when killing might be justified should be recognized.
The conflict between the universal right to liberty and freedom
of religion meet a head-on collision in the debate over abortion. The
predicate, if any exists, to limit abortion, would have to lie under
“the natural law” or “moral law.” As enumerated by Justinian this
would be best determined by studying natural (feral) behavior, rather
than reinterpreting societal norms as enunciated by governmental
leaders on behalf of their populace. To couch reliance on the moral-
ity espoused in the Decalogue requires either use of the original
document (which prohibits murder, meaning of a living human) or
at least acknowledgment that its interpretation is religiously driven.
Given the lack of a finding that abortion violates the natural
law of Justinian (as might be ascertained by the study of zoological
behavior) or the common good of Aristotle (as might be gleaned from
a careful review of the Code of Hammurabi, Justinian or the Torah),
or a survey of how industrialized civilizations the world over have
addressed the issue casts light on the issue. And while emotional re-
sponses to this report are expected—in lieu of careful scholarship—
they should be carefully guarded against.
We must conclude that gross inconsistencies abound in the world
view. However, several trends can be elicited: developed countries
312. Ian Garcia-Kennedy, Plastic Paradise: Brazil’s Cosmetic Surgery Boom, THE
POLITIC (Mar. 28, 2015), http://thepolitic.org/plastic-paradise-brazils-cosmetic-surgery
-boom [http://perma.cc/H8YYV3HS]; Brazil Caesareans: Battle for natural childbirth,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-34464268 [https://
perma.cc/P6HXY9PA].
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allow women more freedom of abortion than impoverished or de-
veloping ones; countries which are (or were) either not religious or
are areligious (atheist/Communist) have the most lenient laws; by
and large, the countries which were most religious—in terms of
population practice—had the most repressive laws, but this is not
religion-specific. Thus, secular Catholic and Islamic countries had
less restrictive laws, while religious Catholic and Islamic countries
had the strictest. In the Orient, population policy seems to play a
major role; and Catholic, Hindu and Islamic countries are split—
some imposing draconian laws, some being quite liberal. Overall, the
most repressive countries were in South America, Africa, the Middle
East, and those below the Equator. The liberal countries tended to
be in Europe, where women have greater freedoms and equality
generally. Nevertheless, one cannot tell whether the freedom to
pursue abortions allowed women the opportunity to advance politi-
cally and professionally and gain more positions of power, or be-
cause women had greater equality and more power generally, they
were able to influence the laws in a way that favors women.
In effect, the U.S. Supreme Court has claimed the power to
legislate into existence, by a bootstrapping argument. The legality
of abortion—i.e., whether (and when) it is considered unlawful
killing (murder) simply by defining the act as unlawful under what-
ever conditions they determine, approving or rejecting state court
decisions or legislative enactments as they see fit.
This Article is not meant to condone (or criticize) the practice of
abortion. It is, however, hoped that the historical perversion sur-
rounding the early writings used to create the misapprehension that
abortion is murder according to both the common good and natural
law, be both exposed, and curtailed. To be sure, there have been times
in our history when religions’ infractions were considered violative
of the civil structure, to wit laws against witchcraft, The Blue Laws,
etc. Nevertheless, while the founding fathers were all God-fearing
men, the country was established on the principle that each man—
and woman—should be able to practice their own religion in peace
and tolerance by all.
Finally, it may be that the Pro-Choice Movement is doing itself
a disservice in using this appellation. Rather, to counter the power of
the phrase “pro-life” it is suggested that the pro-choice commitment
to preserving liberty and religious freedom should be emblematic of
the movement and its torch-bearer’s called “Champions of Free-
dom,” standing proudly to defend religious freedom, which Thomas
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Jefferson, a proud deist,313 once called: “the most inalienable and
sacred of all human rights.” 314
313. John Ragosta, Something to Celebrate on Religious Freedom Day, THE WASHINGTON
POST (Jan. 13, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/something-to
-celebrate-on-religious-freedom-day/2013/01/15/93669700-5f5d-11e2-9dc9-bca
76dd777b8_story.html [https://perma.cc/77V86DV3] (“ ‘We have solved, by fair experi-
ment, the great & interesting question whether freedom of religion is compatible with
order in government, and obedience to the laws’. . . [A]nd we have experienced the quiet
as well as the comfort which results from leaving every one to profess freely and openly
those principles of religion which are the inductions of his own reason & the serious
convictions of his own enquiries.’ ” ) (citations omitted).
314. Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government: Freedom of Religion, FAM. GUARDIAN,
http://famguardian.org/Subjects/Politics/thomasjefferson/jeff1650.htm [http://perma.cc
/75JHBZXD] (citing THE THOMAS JEFFERSON MEMORIAL ASSOCIATION, THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON ME 19:416 (Lipscomb and Bergh, eds. 1903–1907)).
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APPENDIX A:
An Introductory Case-Study
You could see it in her eyes.
Every year during the spring our youth group visited the local
Foundling Home (the place where orphans or very young homeless
children were sent in those days), and handed out gifts of candies
and cake. The Foundling Home is no longer there, but my memory
of it—and one poignant event that happened there—still exist.
I was seventeen. That year, there was a particularly winsome
little girl whose heart beckoned me. I will call her Alissa Goldfine.
She had pixie brown hair and the cutest face with a button nose. She
couldn’t speak. Or maybe she just wouldn’t speak—I never learned.
Over the hours I played with her she never uttered a word.
But you could tell she was intelligent. You could see it in her eyes.
So, I spent our four hour visit eagerly trying to engage this
lonely little girl with bright almond eyes. Alissa was five years
old—significantly older than the other children, who were at most
two or three. When they reached that age, they were sent to a larger
facility better equipped to handle toddlers. But Alissa was not an
orphan. And she did have someplace to go, at least technically—
home. But she remained at the Foundling Home because her par-
ents wanted her close by, so they could visit. You see, Alissa was at
the Home because the Goldfines had eleven other children—and
they just couldn’t handle another.
There were about thirty children in the facility, mostly babies—
and two caretakers. They were (at least to my seventeen-year-old
eyes) capable and caring—but overburdened. Certainly they had no
time to talk to or play with a five-year-old, with all the diaper-
changing and feeding demanded by their other charges. And so,
Alissa remained without company or stimulation, waiting for her
family to come and visit, which I gather wasn’t too often.
But that day Mrs. Goldfine did make an appearance. As we
were leaving for the day, a forty-ish, heavy-set woman made her
way up the stairs. She had black “granny” shoes, a beige loose-
fitting dress and on her disheveled hair sat a squashed navy pillbox
hat—something Jackie Kennedy might have worn in its prior life.
And she was six months pregnant.
Perhaps the pregnancy was simply an accident. Perhaps when
the new baby was conceived Mr. Goldfine had a better job and the
prospective child’s prospects were better than Alissa’s. Perhaps the
Goldfine’s just accepted their lot and never considered whether
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Alissa’s prospective brother or sister would enjoy a better life than
she, now sentenced to a world of isolation. In any event, what choice
did Mrs. Goldfine have but to continue the pregnancy?
For, you see, this happened in 1969.
Four years later Mrs. Goldfine would have had the right, if she
so chose, to have a legal abortion. She may not have accepted that
right. But at least she would have had the choice. Had she lived in
England, she would have had the choice even then.
Ye may kill for yourselves, and
your mates, and your cubs as
they need, and ye can;
But kill not for pleasure of kill-
ing, and seven times never kill
Man.
—From the Law of the Jungle, by Rudyard Kipling315
315. RUDYARD KIPLING, THE SECOND JUNGLE BOOK 30 (The Echo Library 2007).
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APPENDIX B:
A Second Case-Study
Allowing a woman to choose what is best for her and her family
also betters society. This can be best illustrated by example. Sup-
pose we have a family, let’s call them the Deveraux. Mr. and Mrs.
Deveraux have five boys—and have always longed for a daughter.
The Deveraux are not well-off, but are not poor (Mr. Deveraux is a
fireman and Mrs. Deveraux is a department store window dresser.)
They made a decision to try one more time to produce a girl. After
three months, Mrs. Deveraux’s amniocentesis reveals she indeed is
carrying a girl, although one with a genetic defect called Turner’s
syndrome and they are offered the chance to abort the fetus.
Turner’s syndrome is not a fatal condition, but will require more
parenting efforts than those required for a normal child. The
Deveraux decide not to have the abortion and to accept the extra
struggle the child will present, believing that the two of them—
working together—can provide for all the family’s needs. One day
during Mrs. Deveraux’s seventh month, her second son is run over
by a car. He is not killed, but will require substantial physical ther-
apy—at a cost, both of parental effort and financial. At the begin-
ning of her eighth month, Mrs. Deveraux learns she has chronic
Lyme disease. Again, not fatal, but one that will require her to
significantly decrease her working hours. Two weeks later Mr.
Deveraux dies of a heart attack.
Current abortion laws would not allow abortion unless Mrs.
Deveraux can establish that the pregnancy will harm her life or
health.316 It clearly will not. Only an exception allowing the mother
to decide what is best for her family might allow her that out. Other-
wise, she will be compelled to accept public assistance and be forced
to raise her six children as a single mother, something she never
contemplated. Clearly, this is not the “more perfect union” dreamed
of by our Constitutional forefathers.317 The situation presents an
agonizing choice. But the operative word should be “choice.”
316. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 115 (1973) (“For the stage subsequent to viability the
State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses,
regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”).
317. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. See also Roe 410 U.S. at 158–59 (“[T]hroughout the major
portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they
are today, persuades us that the word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment,
does not include the unborn. This is in accord with the results reached in those few cases
where the issue has been squarely presented.”) (citations omitted).

